Ayinde v London Borough of Haringey, and Al Haroun v Qatar National Bank

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Eestimated reading time: 70 min Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 1383 (Admin) Case Nos: AC - ...

 

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e Nos: AC - 2024 - LON - 003062 and CL - 2024 - 000435

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 6 June 2025
Before :

PRESIDENT OF THE KING’S BENCH DIVISION
and
MR JUSTICE JOHNSON
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between :

The King
on the application of
Frederick Ayinde Claimant

- and -
The London Borough of Haringey Defendant

And between :

Hamad Al - Haroun Claimant

- and -
(1) Qatar National Bank QPSC
(2) QNB Capital LLC Defendants
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Ayinde case
Helen Evans KC and Melody Hadfield (instructed by Clyde & Co LLP ) for Sarah Forey (barrister)
Andrew Edge (instructed by Kingsley Napley LLP) for Victor Amadigwe (solicitor) ,
Sunnelah Hussain (paralegal) and Haringey Law Centre

The Al - Haroun case
David Lonsdale (instructed by Primus Solicitors ) for Abid Hussain (solicitor) and Primus Solicitors

Hearing date: 23 May 2025
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down by release to The National Archives on 6 June 2025 at 10.30am.

Approved Judgment Ayinde v Haringey
Al - Haroun v Qatar


Dame Victoria Sharp P.:
Introduction
1. This is the judgment of the court.
2. These two cases have been referred to a Divisional Court and listed together under the
court’s Hamid jurisdiction. That jurisdiction relates to the court’s inherent power to
regulate its own procedures and to enforce duties that lawyers owe to the court: R
(Hamid) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWHC 3070 (Admin)
[2013] CP Rep 6, R (DVP) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWHC
606 (Admin) [2021] 4 WLR 75 at [2].
3. The referrals arise out of the actual or suspected use by lawyers of generative artificial
intelligence tools to produce written legal arguments or witness statements which are
not then checked, so that false information (typically a fake citation or quotatio n) is put
before the court. The facts of these cases raise concerns about the competence and
conduct of the individual lawyers who have been referred to this court. They raise
broader areas of concern however as to the adequacy of the training, supervis ion and
regulation of those who practice before the courts, and as to the practical steps taken by
those with responsibilities in those areas to ensure that lawyers who conduct litigation
understand and comply with their professional and ethical responsibilities and their
duties to the court.
The use of artificial intelligence in court proceedings
4. Artificial intelligence is a powerful technology. It can be a useful tool in litigation, both
civil and criminal. It is used for example to assist in the management of large disclosure
exercises in the Business and Property Courts. A recent report into dis closure in cases
of fraud before the criminal courts has recommended the creation of a cross - agency
protocol covering the ethical and appropriate use of artificial intelligence in the analysis
and disclosure of investigative material. 1
Artificial intelligence is likely to have a
continuing and important role in the conduct of litigation in the future.
5. This comes with an important proviso however. Artificial intelligence is a tool that
carries with it risks as well as opportunities. Its use must take place therefore with an
appropriate degree of oversight, and within a regulatory framework that ensures
c ompliance with well - established professional and ethical standards if public
confidence in the administration of justice is to be maintained. As Dias J said when
referring the case of Al - Haroun to this court, the administration of justice depends upon
the court being able to rely without question on the integrity of those who appear before
it and on their professionalism in only making submissions which can properly be
supported.
6. In the context of legal research, the risks of using artificial intelligence are now well
known. 2
F reely available generative artificial intelligence tools, trained on a large

1
Disclosure in the Digital Age, Independent Review of Disclosure and Fraud Offences, Jonathan Fisher KC,
recommendation 2 and paragraphs 430 - 433.
2
The a ppendix to this judgment contains examples from different jurisdictions of material being put before a
court that is generated by an artificial intelligence tool, but which is erroneous.

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Al - Haroun v Qatar


language model such as ChatGPT are not capable of conducting reliable legal research.
Such tools can produce apparently coherent and plausible responses to prompts, but
those coherent and plausible responses may turn out to be entirely incorrect. The
responses may make confident assertions that are simply untrue. They may cite sources
that do not exist. They may purport to quote passages from a genuine source that do not
appear in that source. 3

7. Those who use artificial intelligence to conduct legal research notwithstanding these
risks have a professional duty therefore to check the ........ .. .... ........ ..
reference to authoritative sources, before using it in the course of their professional
work (to advise clients or before a court , for example). Authoritative sources include
the Government’s ........ .. ..........., ... ........ ........ ........ .. .....
judgments, the official Law Reports published by the Incorporated Council of Law
Repor ting for England and Wales and the databases of reputable legal publishers.
8. This duty rests on lawyers who use artificial intelligence to conduct research themselves
or rely on the work of others who have done so. This is no different from the
responsibility of a lawyer who relies on the work of a trainee solicitor or a pupil barrister
for example, or on information obtained from an internet search.
9. We would go further however. There are serious implications for the administration of
justice and public confidence in the justice system if artificial intelligence is misused.
In those circumstances, practical and effective measures must now be taken by t hose
within the legal profession with individual leadership responsibilities (such as h eads of
chambers and managing partners) and by those with the responsibility for regulating
the provision of legal services. Those measures must ensure that every indivi dual
currently providing legal services within this jurisdiction (whenever and wherever they
were qualified to do so) understands and complies with their professional and ethical
obligations and their duties to the court if using artificial intelligence. F or the future, in
Hamid hearings such as these, the profession can expect the court to inquire whether
those leadership responsibilities have been fulfilled.
Existing guidance
10. There is no shortage of professional guidance available about the limitations of artificial
intelligence and the risks of using it for legal research.
11. The Bar Council published guidance in January 2024, headed: “Considerations when
using ChatGPT and generative artificial intelligence software based on large language
models.”
12. This document states (at paragraph 17):
“ The ability of LLMs [large language models] to generate
convincing but false content raises ethical concerns. Do not

3
Though in this judgment we use the shorthand to describe this as “false” or “fake” information, the information
produced by generative large language model artificial intelligence tools is a result of their operational design.
They generate textual respon ses by predicting what words or phrases come next in a particular context, based on
patterns identified from a vast quantity of training data.

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Al - Haroun v Qatar


therefore take such systems’ outputs on trust and certainly not at
face value … It matters not that the misleading of the court may
have been inadvertent, as it would still be considered
incompetent and grossly negligent. Such conduct brings the
profession into disrepute (a breach of Core Duty 5), which may
well lead to disciplinary proceedings. Barristers may also face
professional negligence, defamation and/or data protection
claims through careless or inappropriate use of these systems. As
set out above, the data used to ‘train’ generative LLMs may not
be up to date; and can sometimes produce responses that are
ambiguous, inaccurate or contaminated with inherent biases.
Inherent bias may be invisible as it arises not only in the
processing or training, but prior to that in the assembling of the
training materials. LLMs may also generate responses which are
out of context. For these reasons it is important for barristers to
verify the output of AI ... ........ ... ........ ......
procedures for checking the generative outputs.”
13. Similar warnings are contained in a document published by the Solicitors Regulation
Authority, entitled “ Risk Outlook report: the use of artificial intelligence in the legal
market, 20 November 2023 ” . This says:
“ All computers can make mistakes. AI language models such as
ChatGPT, however, can be more prone to this. That is because
they work by anticipating the text that should follow the input
they are given, but do not have a concept of ‘ reality ’ . The result
is known as ‘ hallucination ’ , where a system produces highly
plausible but incorrect results. ”
14. We were also referred to a blog published by the Bar Standards Board on 8 October
2023 entitled “ChatGPT in the Courts: Safely and Effectively Navigating AI in Legal
Practice”. It refers to Mata v Avianca Inc . an American case, summarise d in the
appendix to this judgment. The blog says:
“T wo lawyers … used ChatGPT – a large language model AI –
to identify relevant caselaw. One prompted the tool to draft a
court submission, which they submitted verbatim on behalf of
their client. However, unbeknownst to them, the AI - generated
legal analysis was faulty and contained fictional citations …

…t he AI output was entirely fabricated, falsely attributing
nonsensical opinions to real judges and embellished with further
false citations and docket numbers held by actual cases irrelevant
to the matter at hand ….

AI, while a promising tool, is not a replacement for human
responsibility and oversight. A lawyer is answerable for their

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Al - Haroun v Qatar


research, arguments, and representations under their core duties
to the Court and to their client. These duties continue to hold true
when utilising AI. This case demonstrates that it is more
important than ever to understand the capabilities and limitatio ns
of a new technology to ensure that its contributions are genuine
aids, not sources of misinformation. ”
15. Guidance is also given to judges about the use of artificial intelligence. That guidance,
first provided in December 2023 and updated in April 2025, is published on the
judiciary’s website . 4
Its contents are as relevant to the use of artificial intelligence by
lawyers as they are to its use by the judiciary. It makes clear that it is necessary to
uphold confidentiality and ....... .. ... ........ .... . ...... .......... ............
tool any information that is not already in the public domain. It also makes clear that it
is necessary to check any information that is provided by an artificial intelligence tool
before it is used or relied upon. It further emphasises the need to be aware that artificial
intelligence tools may make up fictitious cases, citations or quotes, or refer to
le gislation, articles or legal texts that do not exist, or provide incorrect or misleading
information regarding the law or how it might apply, or make factual errors.
16. Importantly, the guidance says that: “ All legal representatives are responsible for the
material they put before the court/tribunal and have a professional obligation to ensure
it is accurate and appropriate. ” It warns about the risks of using generative artificial
intelligence for legal research or legal analysis: “Legal research: AI tools are a poor
way of conducting research to find new information you cannot verify independently.
They may be useful as a wa y to be reminded of material you would recognise as correct.
Legal analysis: the current public AI chatbots do not produce convincing analysis or
reasoning.”
Lawyers’ regulatory duties : Barristers
17. The Bar Standards Board Handbook 5
contains rules about how barristers must behave
and work and the Code of Conduct for barristers. The Code of Conduct includes the ten
Core Duties (CDs) which underpin the Bar Standards Board’s regulatory framework,
and the rules which supplement those Cor e Duties. Compliance with the Core Duties
and the r ules is mandatory. The Code of Conduct also identifies the outcomes which
compliance with the Core Duties and the rules are designed to achieve.
18. Materially in this context, barristers must observe their duty to the court in the
administration of justice (CD 1). They must act with honesty and integrity (CD 3). They
must not behave in a way which is likely to diminish the trust and confidence which t he
public places in the profession (CD 5). They must provide a competent standard of work
to each client (CD 7). The outcomes which compliance with these Core Duties are
designed to achieve include the following: the court is able to rely on information
pr ovided to it by those conducting litigation and by advocates who appear before it

4
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp - content/uploads/2025/04/Refreshed - AI - Guidance - published - version - website -
version.pdf
5
Version 4.8 came into force on 21 May 2024.

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Al - Haroun v Qatar


(Outcome 1); the proper administration of justice is served (Outcome 2) and those who
appear before the court understand clearly their duties to the court (Outcome 4).
19. Further, barristers are under a duty not to knowingly or recklessly mislead or attempt
to mislead the court or anyone else (Rules C3.1 and C9.1). They are under a duty not
to draft any document containing a contention which the author does not consider to be
properly arguable (Rule C9.2.b) and they are under a duty to provide a competent
standard of work (Rule C18).
20. The Bar Standards Board also publishes “The Professional Statement for Barristers”
which sets out the knowledge, skills and attributes that all barristers must have on “day
one” of practice. They include compliance with regulatory requirements (paragraph
1 .16); an ability to draft court documents which are accurate, and skeleton arguments
which present the relevant law and cite authorities in an appropriate manner (paragraphs
1.13 and 1.14); and an ability to recognise and operate within the limits of their
competence (paragraph 1.18).
21. The Bar Qualification Manual requires pupil supervisors to provide pupils with a
suitable training programme that enables them to meet the competences in the
Professional Statement. It requires that pupil supervisors are appropriately trained.
Documentation must be in place to evidence a pupil’s progress against the
competencies set out in the Professional Statement. There are specific requirements in
relation to evaluation, .......... ... .......... . ..... .... ... .. ...... ... ..
having completed the non - practising or practising period of pupillage unless the defined
standards and competencies have been met.
Lawyers’ regulatory duties: Solicitors
22. The position is materially similar for solicitors. The Code of Conduct of the Solicitors
Regulation Authority (the SRA) describes the standards of professionalism that the
SRA and the public expects of individuals authorised by the SRA to provide legal
ser vices. The SRA’s Rules of Conduct provide in part as follows. Solicitors are under
a duty not to mislead the court or others including by omission (Rule 1.4). They are
under a duty only to make assertions or put forward statements, representations or
submi ssions to the court or others which are properly arguable (Rule 2.4). They are
under a duty not to waste the court’s time (Rule 2.6). They are under a duty to draw the
court’s attention to relevant cases and statutory provisions of which the lawyer is aware
and which are likely to have a material effect on the ou tcome (Rule 2.7). They are under
a duty to provide a competent service (Rule 3.2). Further, where work is conducted on
a solicitor’s behalf by others, the solicitor remains accountable for the work (Rule 3.5).
The court’s powers
23. The court has a range of powers to ensure that lawyers comply with their duties to the
court. Where those duties are not complied with, the court’s powers include public
admonition of the lawyer, the imposition of a costs order, the imposition of a wasted
costs order, striking out a case, referral to a regulator, the initiation of contempt
proceedings, and referral to the police.

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Al - Haroun v Qatar


24. The court’s response will depend on the particular facts of the case. Relevant factors
are likely to include: (a) the importance of setting and enforcing proper standards; (b)
the circumstances in which false material came to be put before the court; (c) w hether
an immediate, full and truthful explanation is given to the court and to other parties to
the case; (d) the steps taken to mitigate the damage, if any; (e) the time and expense
incurred by other parties to the case, and the resources used by the cou rt in addressing
the matter; (f) the impact on the underlying litigation and (g) the overriding objective
of dealing with cases justly and at proportionate cost.
Referral to the police for a criminal investigation
25. In the most egregious cases, deliberately placing false material before the court with
the intention of interfering with the administration of justice amounts to the common
law criminal offence of perverting the course of justice, carrying a maximum senten ce
of life imprisonment. There has been one instance (not involving artificial intelligence)
where a member of the Bar was imprisoned for 12 months for perverting the course of
justice after deliberately causing a fake authority to be placed before the cou rt by
another person. He was subsequently disbarred: Bar Standards Board decision of 10
November 2008 . Where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a lawyer has
committed a serious criminal offence, the appropriate response is likely to be that the
court will refer the papers to the police to consider undertaking a criminal investigation.
Such cases are likely to be extremely rare.
Contempt of court
26. Placing false material before the court with the intention that the court treats it as
genuine may, depending on the person’s state of knowledge, amount to a contempt.
That is because it deliberately interferes with the administration of justice. In R v Weisz
ex p Hector Macdonald Ltd [1951] 2 KB 611 Lord Goddard CJ, Hilbery J and Devlin
J held that an attempt to deceive a court by disguising the true nature of the claim by
the indorsement on a writ (a claim for an unenforceable gambling debt dressed up as a
claim for “an account stated”) amounted to a contempt. As to the requisite state of
knowledge, mere negligence as to the falsity of the material is insufficient. There must
be knowledge that it is false, or a lack of an honest belief that it is true: JSC BTA Bank
v Ereschchenko [2013] EWCA Civ 829 per Lloyd LJ at [42], Newson - Smith v Al
Zawawi [2017] EWHC 1876 (QB) per Whipple J at [12] , Norman v Adler [2023]
EWCA Civ 785 [2023] 1 WLR 4232 per Thirlwall LJ at [61].
27. Proceedings for contempt of court may be initiated under part 81 of the Civil Procedure
Rules (CPR) by the court of its own motion, or by a Law Officer, or by anyone with a
sufficient interest (such as a party in the case). The maximum term for which a
contemnor, on one occasion, may be committed to prison is 2 years: Contempt of Court
Act 1981 , section 14(1) .
28. Where the court considers that a contempt of court may have been committed, it shall,
on its own initiative, consider whether to initiate contempt proceedings: CPR 81.6. This
is a two - stage process. The first, or threshold, stage is the .......... .. ..... .. .
contempt may have been committed. The second is an evaluative judgement as to
whether contempt proceedings should be initiated: R (Clearsprings Ready Homes Ltd)

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Al - Haroun v Qatar


v Swindon Magistrates’ Court [2024] EWHC 3245 (Admin) per Warby LJ and Dove J
at [15]. 6

Referral to regulator
29. Where a lawyer places false citations before the court (whether because of the use of
artificial intelligence without proper checks being made, or otherwise) that is likely to
involve a breach of one or more of the regulatory requirements that we have set out
above, and it is likely to be appropriate for the court to make a reference to the regulator.
Strike out and costs sanctions
30. A wasted costs order may be appropriate where the conditions in section 51(6) and (7)
Senior Courts Act 1981 and paragraph 5.5 of CPR Practice Direction 46 are satisfied.
It is necessary to show that the lawyer has acted improperly, unreasonably or
neglige ntly, that their conduct has caused a party to incur unnecessary costs and that it
is just in all the circumstances to make an order. It is always necessary to apply the
important procedural safeguards in CPR 46.8 (including providing the lawyer with a
rea sonable opportunity to make submissions or, if they prefer, to attend a hearing,
before making the order). In principle, and subject to any explanation, we agree with
Ritchie J that placing false material before the court with the intention of the court
tr eating it as genuine amounts to improper and unreasonable and negligent conduct.
Any lawyer who does this is at risk of the imposition of a wasted costs order.
Admonishment
31. Submissions were made to us as to the salutary effect of public admonishment, thereby
mitigating any requirement to refer lawyers to their regulatory bodies or to deal with
the matter as a contempt . We do not underestimate the impact of public criticism in a
court judgment or indeed of appearing before a Divisional Court in circumstances such
as these. However, the risks posed to the administration of justice if fake material is
placed before a court are such that, save in exceptional circumstances, admonis hment
alone is unlikely to be a sufficient response.
The Ayinde case
The background
32. The claimant, Mr Ayinde, brought proceedings for judicial review against the London
Borough of Haringey (the defendant) in respect of its failure to provide interim
accommodation pending a statutory review of a decision that he did not have a priority
need for housing. Mr Ayinde was represented by the Haringey Law Centre. Mr Victor
Amadigwe is a solicitor. He is the Chief Executive of the Haringey Law Centre. Ms
Sunnelah Hussain is a paralegal working under his supervision. Ms Sarah Forey of
counsel was ins tructed on behalf of the claimant. The grounds for judicial review were
settled and signed by Ms Forey.

6
There is nothing new in this. The court has always taken steps to protect the integrity of its proceedings: Myers
v Elman [1940] AC 282 per Lord Wright at 319.

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Al - Haroun v Qatar


33. In those grounds, Ms Forey wrote:
“The statutory duty under Section 188(3) of the Housing Act
1996 requires a local authority to provide interim
accommodation when an individual has applied for a review of
a homelessness decision.”
34. This misstates the effect of section 188(3). Section 188(3) provides that:
“… the authority may secure that accommodation is available for
the applicant ’ s occupation pending a decision on review. ”
35. Ms Forey then wrote:
“In R (on the application of El Gendi) v Camden LBC [2020]
EWHC 2435 (Admin), the High Court emphasized that failing
to provide interim accommodation during the review process
undermines the protective purpose of the homelessness
legislation. The court fou nd that such a failure not only
constitutes a breach of statutory duty but also creates
unnecessary hardship for vulnerable individuals. The
Respondent’s similar failure in the present case demonstrates
procedural impropriety warranting judicial review.”
36. The case that is cited (El Gendi) does not exist. There is no case with that name, held
by the National Archives, or anywhere else. The neutral citation number, [2020] EWHC
2435 (Admin), does exist, but it is the citation reference to a different case: R
(Preservation and Promotion of the Arts Ltd) v Greater Manchester Magistrates’ Court
[2020] EWHC 2435 (Admin). That case concerns a charity’s liability to pay business
rates. It has nothing to do with duties under the Housing Act 1996.
37. The grounds settled by Ms Forey included the following further passages:
“Moreover, in R (on the application of Ibrahim) v Waltham
Forest LBC [2019] EWHC 1873 (Admin), the court quashed a
local authority decision due to its failure to properly consider the
applicant’s medical needs, underscoring the necessity for careful
evaluation of such evidence in homelessness determinations.
The Respondent’s failure to consider the Appellant’s medical
conditions in their entirety, despite being presented with
comprehensive medical documentation, renders their decision
procedurally improper and irrational.
…
The Appellant’s situation mirrors the facts in R (on the
application of H) v Ealing LBC [2021] EWHC 939 (Admin ),
where the court found the local authority’s failure to provide
interim accommodation irrational in light of the applicant’s

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vulnerability and the potential consequences of homelessness.
The Respondent’s conduct in this case similarly lacks rational
basis and demonstrates a failure to properly exercise its
discretion.
…
The Respondent’s failure to provide a timely response and its
refusal to offer interim accommodation have denied the
Appellant a fair opportunity to secure his rights under the
homelessness legislation. This breach is further highlighted in R
(on the application of KN) v Barnet LBC [2020] EWHC 1066
(Admin), where the court held that procedural fairness includes
timely decision - making and the provision of necessary
accommodations during the review process. The Respondent’s
failure to adhere to these principl es constitutes a breach of the
duty to act fairly.

The Appellant’s case further aligns with the principles set out in
R (on the application of Balogun) v LB Lambeth [2020] EWCA
Civ 1442 , whe re the Court of Appeal emphasized that local
authorities must ensure fair treatment of applicants in the
homelessness review process. The Respondent’s conduct in
failing to provide interim accommodation or a timely decision
breaches this standard of fairne ss.”
38. The four further cases cited by Ms Forey do not exist either. We note too the
Americanised spelling of “emphasized”, which contrasts with the English spelling of
the same word by Ms Forey in correspondence; and further, the somewhat formulaic
style of the prose.
39. On 4 February 2025, the solicitor for the defendant, Mr Greenberg, wrote to Mr
Amadigwe (copied to Ms Hussain) and said that they could not find five of the cases
set out in the grounds. On the same day, Ms Hussain emailed Ms Forey and asked her
to provide copies of the five cases. Mr Amadigwe also wrote to Ms Forey the same day
and asked her to provide copies of the five cases. Ms Hussain repeated the request on a
call with Ms Forey the next day. 7

40. Mr Greenberg sent a second letter to Mr Amadigwe (copied to Ms Hussain) under cover
of an email dated 18 February 2025. In that letter, Mr Greenberg said that they had
conducted searches for the five cases and had also instructed counsel to assist. He
explained the outcome of those searches. The cases cited did not exist. He drew
attention to Olsen v Finansiel Stabilitet A/S [2025] EWHC 42 (KB) (a case summarised
in the appendix) and pointed out “the severity of seeking to rely on cases that do not
exist.” Mr Greenberg also pointed out that the grounds of claim misstated the effect of
section 188(3) of the Housing Act 1996. He said that the defendant would be making a
wasted costs application against Haringey Law Centre and/or Ms Forey.

7
We know all of this because the claimant, Mr Ayinde , has waived legal professional privilege.

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Al - Haroun v Qatar


41. Ms Hussain forwarded Mr Greenberg’s second letter to Ms Forey on the same day (18
February). Ms Hussain asked Ms Forey once again for copies of the five cases and for
a response she could send to the defendant. On 22 February, Ms Hussain called Ms
Forey who said that she was going to meet with a colleague to provide the cases and
that she would send them shortly.
42. On 4 March 2025 Ms Forey sent Ms Hussain a draft response to be sent to the defendant.
In a call with Ms Hussain after circulating the draft response, Ms Forey said that she
was still learning, and asked if Ms Hussain or Mr Amadigwe could review the draft
response. Ms Hussain forwarded the draft response to Mr Amadigwe who responded
“You can send it, but change ‘me’ to ‘we’ and ‘I’ to ‘we’”. Ms Hussain m ade those
changes (and no other changes) and on 5 March sent an email to the defendant. This
was in terms of Ms Forey’s draft, with the changes ‘me’ to ‘we’ and ‘I’ to ‘we’ only.
The email said:
“We regret to say that we still do not see the point you are making
by correlating any errors in citations to the issues addressed in
the request for judicial review in this matter. Admittedly, there
could be some concessions from our side in relation to a ny
erroneous citation in the grounds, which are easily explained and
can be corrected on the record if it were immediately necessary
to do so. What you have not done is to refute the veracity of the
points and legal arguments that prevailed against your po sition
and any failures of your client to measure up to its obligations
under the 1996 Act. Indeed, it appears that you have not only
taken any and all of our paraphrases and references out of
context, but that you have also misinterpreted the context, sco pe
and authority of section 188(3) of the said Act.

We do not think that our duty of care should go so far as to
provide legal interpretation of the laws for your benefit, but we
hasten to say that section 188(3) provides for discretionary
action in relation to section 202 and so long as that duty falls
out side section 189B(2). It is not a broad brushed discretion that
results from the ‘May’ in that subsection. We therefore do not
quite grasp in what context you say: Haringey have a discretion.
There is no obligation.

So let us agree that the citation errors can be corrected on the
record ahead of our April hearing. Apart from adding our deepest
apologies, we do not consider that we are obliged to explain
anything further to you directly. You may better serve your
organ isation by giving attention not to the normative discoveries
you have made, but whether you can locate the authorities in
support of the points raised, which points you are clearly in
agreement with, as demonstrated both by conduct in offering the
necessar y relief to our client and acting in accordance with the
mandate of your client.

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Al - Haroun v Qatar


We hope that you are not raising these errors as technicalities to
avoid undertaking really serious legal research. Treating with
citations is a totally separate matter for which we will take full
responsibility. It appears to us improper to barter our cli ent's
legal position for cosmetic errors as serious as those can be for
us as legal practitioners. For the foregoing reasons alone, your
claim for costs and the costs of your letters are rejected as
without foundation. Your response or arguments in defence
cannot rely on errors in citation to prevail but on the evidential
and meritorious basis of your points. We will prepare the bundle
index and send this to you shortly for your consideration.”
43. On 7 March 2025, the defendant made an application for a wasted costs order against
Haringey Law Centre and Ms Forey. This was made on the grounds that they had cited
five fake cases, they had failed to produce copies of the cases when requested to do so,
and they had misstated the effect of section 188(3) of the Housing Act 1996 throughout
the grounds.
The hearing before Ritchie J
44. On 3 April 2025, the wasted costs application was heard by Ritchie J. By that stage, the
defendant had provided accommodation for the claimant and the underlying claim for
judicial review had been resolved.
45. At the hearing, Ms Forey did not formally give evidence, but she did give her
explanation for what ha d happened. According to the judgment of Ritchie J ([2025]
EWHC 1040 ( Admin )) , she said that she kept a box of copies of cases, and she kept a
paper and digital list of cases with their ratios. She said that she had “dragged and
dropped” the reference to El Gendi from that list into the grounds for judicial review.
46. At [53], Ritchie J rejected this explanation:
“I do not understand that explanation or how it hangs together.
If she herself had put together, through research, a list of cases
and they were photocopied in a box, this case could not have
been one of them because it does not exist. Secondly, if she had
written a table of cases and the ratio of each case, this could not
have been in that table because it does not exist. Thirdly, if she
had dropped it into an important court pleading, for which she
bears professional responsibility because she puts her na me on
it, she should not have been making the submission to a High
Court Judge that this case actually ever existed, because it does
not exist. I find as a fact that the case did not exist. I reject Miss
Forey’s explanation.”
47. After describing the email of 5 March 2025 as “remarkable”, Ritchie J added, at [46]:

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“I do not consider that it was fair or reasonable to say that the
erroneous citations could easily be explained and then to refuse
to explain them. Nor do I consider it was professional,
reasonable or fair to say it was not necessary to explain the
citatio ns. The assertion that they agreed to correct the citations
before April never came true, for they never did. The assertion
that no further explanation or obligation to provide an
explanation was necessary or arose is, in my judgment, quite
wrong. Worst of all, the assertion that the citations are merely
cosmetic errors is a grossly unprofessional categorisation.”
48. Ritchie J found, at [64] to [65], that the behaviour of Ms Forey and the Haringey Law
Centre had been improper and unreasonable and negligent:
“64. …It is wholly improper to put fake cases in a pleading. It
was unreasonable, when it was pointed out, to say that these fake
cases were “minor citation errors” or to use the phrase of the
solicitors, “Cosmetic errors”. I should say it is the responsib ility
of the legal team, including the solicitors, to see that the
statement of facts and grounds are correct. They should have
been shocked when they were told that the citations did not exist.
Ms Forey should have reported herself to the Bar Council. I t hink
also that the solicitors should have reported themselves to the
Solicitors Regulation Authority. I consider that providing a fake
description of five fake cases, including a Court of Appeal case,
qualifies quite clearly as professional misconduct.

65. On the balance of probabilities, I consider that it would have
been negligent for this barrister, if she used AI and did not check
it, to put that text into her pleading. However, I am not in a
position to determine whether she did use AI. I find as a fact that
Ms Forey intentionally put these cases into her statement of facts
and grounds, not caring whether they existed or not, because she
had got them from a source which I do not know but certainly
was not photocopying cases, putting them in a box and tabulating
them, and certainly not from any law report. I do not accept that
it is possible to photocopy a non - existent case and tabulate it.
Improper and unreasonable conduct are finding[s] about which I
am sure. In relation to negligence I am unsure but I consider that
it would fall into that category if Ms Forey obtained the text from
AI and failed to check it.”
49. Ritchie J found that this conduct caused the defendant loss and that the justice of the
case required him to make a wasted costs order. He ordered Ms Forey and the Haringey
Law Centre each to pay £2,000 to the defendant. He also required the matter to be
r eferred to the Bar Standards Board and the Solicitors Regulation Authority. On 9 May
2025, Ritchie J made an order referring the case to the Hamid judge, Linden J.

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Evidence
50. Ms Forey, Ms Hussain and Mr Amadigwe (who has supervisory responsibilities in
respect of Ms Hussain) have each filed a witness statement. Ms Forey filed a second
witness statement on the evening before this Hamid hearing.
Ms Forey
51. Ms Forey sets out in her first statement her education and background. We have taken
that into account, and we do not consider it necessary to recite it in this judgment. Ms
Forey was called to the Bar in 2021 and started her pupillage in September 2023. At the
time of the hearing before Ritchie J she was still a pupil barrister. She says that she had
received little formal supervision during her first six months pupillage. She does not
recall attending court with a member of chambers in relation to a cla im for judicial
review in a homelessness case. She says that during her second six months pupillage
she had an extremely busy practice in her own right. She did not receive any
supervision. None of her written work was checked.
52. She says that at the time of the application for wasted costs before Ritchie J she was
extremely upset. In written and oral submissions advanced on her behalf, it was said ,
notwithstanding the terms of the defendant’s letter of 18 February , that s he was
“blindsided”. She says she did not manage properly to explain to Ritchie J how she
worked, and that it was not correct that she “kept a box of copies of cases” and that
these were “photocopied in a box”. She does not think she said this. She says she has
nev er kept hard copies of cases in a box; all her research is conducted electronically.
The list of cases that she put together with their ratios and principles was derived from
electronic sources. She says that she has since conducted research “into the wron gly
cited cases”:
“I… was able to locate a case R (Kelly and ORS) v Birmingham
[2009] EWHC 3240 (Admin). Foolishly I did not take a copy of
the Judgment to Court I can see from the similarities to what I
had wrongly described as being the case of R (on the application
of El Gendi) v Camden London Borough Council EWHC 2435
(Admin), that this would have been the case that I had been
referring to in the Skeleton Argument, but with a wrongful
citation. I realise now that this case did not in any event relate to
s188(3) of the Ho using Act but to s188(1).”
53. She denies using artificial intelligence tools to assist her with legal research and says
that she is aware that artificial intelligence “is not a reliable source.” She says that once
the issue was raised by Haringey Council, she drafted the email that was then sent by
Haringey Law Centre on 5 March 2025.
54. Ms Forey fully accepts that she acted negligently, and she apologises to the court for
that. In her first witness statement she denied that she acted improperly or unreasonably
and denied that she was seeking or intending to mislead the court. During the course of
the hearing before us, she maintained that position save that she accepted that she had
acted unreasonably.

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55. Ms Forey has informed us of a separate incident where she put false material before a
court. That was a case before the County Court where she was, again, instructed by the
Haringey Law Centre. The hearing was on 10 April 2025, before His Honour Judge
Andr ew Holmes (the judge). Ms Forey was unable to conduct the hearing and another
counsel (from a different set of chambers) was instructed in her stead. That counsel
drew attention to the fact that the application before the judge contained false material :
sp ecifically the grounds of appeal and the skeleton argument settled by Ms Forey
contained references to a number of cases that do not exist. On the day of that hearing,
the judge wrote to Ms Forey’s Head of Chambers. He raised the question of a referral
to the Bar Standards Board. In the event, however, the judge was satisfied with
assurances given by Ms Forey and her Head of Chambers and so did not refer the case
to the regulator.
56. Ms Forey says that on 22 April 2025 a senior member of her chambers advised her to
delete her list of cases/research and instead to use a recognised legal search engine. She
accepted that advice. It follows that she has not been able to put her list of cas es before
us, or explain for that matter where the list of cases and citations derived from .
57. In her second witness statement, Ms Forey says that when she drafted the grounds she
“may also have carried out searches on Google or Safari” and that she may have taken
account of artificial intelligence generated summaries of the results (without realisi ng
what they were). She also says that on 4 March 2025 she told Ms Hussain that she had
been unable to find the case reports.
Ms Hussain and Mr Amadigwe
58. Ms Hussain and Mr Amadigwe have also each apologised to the court. Mr Amadigwe
explains that the Haringey Law Centre is a charitable organisation that operates with
minimal public funding. It has a limited workforce, but a very significant volume of
cases. Ms Hussain is a paralegal. She is not a qualified solicitor. 8

59. Mr Amadigwe says that Haringey Law Centre relies heavily on the expertise of
specialist counsel. It has not been its practice to verify the ........ .. .... ......... ..
to check the genuineness of authorities relied on by counsel. It had not occurred to either
Ms Hussain or Mr Amadigwe that couns el would rely on authorities that do not exist.
When Haringey Council raised concerns about the five authorities, Ms Hussain and Mr
Amadigwe wrote to Ms Forey and asked her to provide copies of the cases. Ms Forey
did not do so, but she did provide the wor ding for the email that Ms Hussain sent on 5
March 2025. In the light of that wording, Ms Hussain and Mr Amadigwe did not
appreciate that the five cases that had been cited were fake – they wrongly thought that
there were min or errors in the citations whic h would be corrected before the court. Ms
Hussain denies that Ms Forey told her that she had been unable to find the cases. It was
only at the hearing before Ritchie J that they realised that the authorities did not exist.
Mr Amadigwe has now given instruc tions to all his colleagues within Haringey Law
Centre that all citations referred to by any counsel must be checked.

8
A paralegal is not, generally, a solicitor or barrister and is thus not subject to the same regulatory requirements.
They can only do certain work under the direct supervision of a regulated lawyer.

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Submissions
60. Helen Evans KC, for Ms Forey, submit s th at the threshold for the initiation of contempt
proceedings is not met. That is because (a) Ms Forey did not know the citations were
false; (b) the errors did not make any difference to the outcome; (c) Ms Forey was very
inexperienced and had a difficult working and home environment; (d) she did not
appreciate the gravity of what had gone wrong and (e) she now realises the seriousness
of her mistakes, apologises for them and has shown insight.
61. Andrew Edge, for Mr A madigwe , Ms Hussain and the Haringey Law Centre, submits
that M s Forey bears the primary responsibility for what occurred. He accepts that Mr
Amadigwe should have appreciated the seriousness of the matter once it was raised by
the local authority, and that inadequate steps were taken in response. He stresses that
this must be viewed in the context of an overstretched charity with limited resources.
He submits that the threshold for initiating contempt proceedings has not been met and
th at, in the light of the steps that are now being taken, it is not necessary or proportionate
to refer Mr Amadigwe to the regulator. In respect of Ms Hussain, he submits that she
was blameless . She was a paralegal working with instructed counsel under the
supervision of Mr Amadigwe, a solicitor, and had acted in accordance with his
directions, including when liaising with counsel .
62. In the light of Ms Forey’s evidence in her witness statement as to her training, her
chambers were informed by the court of this Hamid hearing, provided with the hearing
bundle, and invited to attend (or be represented at) the hearing on the basis that the court
might wish to consider the extent to which Ms Forey had been properly supervised.
Following the hearing, the court received an e mail communication from the C hambers
D irector at Ms Forey’s chambers , Mr Forjour. This disputes Ms Forey’s account that
s he received inadequate supervision. We arranged for a copy of the email to be sent to
Ms Evans and Mr Edge, but without seeking further evidence or submissions.
Our conclusions
63. In our judgment, Ms Hussain is not at fault in any way. She acted appropriately
throughout. She referred all matters to Mr Amadigwe, who was supervising her, or to
Ms Forey, who was instructed counsel and she acted entirely in accordance with what
she was told to do by Mr Amadigwe. Ritchie J could not have known this, because at
the time of the hearing before him privilege had not been waived and, on the face of the
documents, Ms Hussain had written the email of 5 March 2025. We have the benefit of
the cont emporaneous attendance notes and internal emails which make the position
clear.
64. As for Ms Forey, as we have said, Ritchie J did not accept her account given at the
hearing on 3 April as to how she had come to rely on false information (the fake cases)
and materially misstate the law. 9


9
As to the status of those findings in the context of potential contempt proceedings , Ms Evans drew our attention
to Frain v Reeves [2023] EWHC 73 (Ch) per Joanna Smith J at [33], and Bailey v Bailey [2022] EWFC 5 per Peel
J at [10] to [17] . S ubject to admissibility (which Ms Evans conceded), it would be for the court to decide how
much weight to attribute to those findings but nothing derogates from the long established principle that contempt
must be proved to the criminal standard.

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65. Since then, privilege has been waived, the attendance notes and the communications
between Ms Forey, Ms Hussain and Mr Amadigwe have been disclosed, and Ms Forey
has provided two witness statements.
66. Ms Forey now accepts that she is at fault to a degree, but maintains her denial that she
used generative artificial intelligence tools when preparing her list of cases or the
grounds for judicial review. She says that her list of cases was compiled from various
identified websites. It is not, however, suggest ed that any of the fake cases that she cited
appeared, or have ever appeared, on those websites. In her most recent statement, she
says that she would make general internet searches, but is now unable t o identify any
source for the fake cases anywhere on the internet ( Ms Evans told us her instructing
solicitors had conducted an internet search but could find no reference to those fake
citations save to the reference to them in the judgment of Ritchie J and the subsequent
reporting of that judgment). Ms Forey says in her second witness statement that some
internet searches (on Google for example) provide a summary response which is
produced by a generative artificial intelligence tool. We were not, however , provided
with any evidence to support a contention (which in any event, was not directly
advanced) that the fake cases that Ms Forey put before the court in Mr Ayinde’s claim
for judicial review might have emerged in that way.
67. Ms Forey refuses to accept that her conduct was improper. She says that the underlying
legal principles for which the cases were cited were sound, and that there are other
authorities that could be cited to support those principles. She went as far as to s tate
that these other authorities were the authorities that she “intended” to cite (a proposition
which, if taken literally, is not credible). An analogy was drawn with the mislabelling
of a tin where the tin, in fact, contains the correct product. In our judgment, this entirely
misses the point and shows a worrying lack of insight. We do not accept that a lack of
access to textbooks or electronic subscription services within chambers, if that is the
position, provides anything more than marginal mitigation . Ms Forey could have
checked the cases she cited by searching the National Archives’ caselaw website or by
going to the law library of her Inn of Court. We regret to say that she has not provided
to the court a coherent explanation for what happened.
68. On the material before us, there seem to be two possible scenarios. One is that Ms Forey
deliberately included fake citations in her written work. That would be a clear contempt
of court. The other is that she did use generative artificial intelligence tools to produce
her list of cases and/or to draft parts of the grounds of cl aim. In that event, her denial
(in a witness statement supported by a statement of truth) is untruthful. Again, that
would amount to a contempt. In all the circumstances, we consider that the threshold
for initiating contempt proceedings is met.
69. However, we have decided not to initiate contempt proceedings or to refer the case to
the Law Officers. First, there are a number of factual issues which could not easily be
determined in the course of summary proceedings for contempt. Secondly, there are
questions raised as to potential failings on the part of those who had responsibility for
training Ms Forey, for supervising her, for “signing off” her pupillage, for allocating
work to her, and for marketing her services. Those could not be addressed in c ontempt
proceedings brought against Ms Forey alone. Thirdly, Ms Forey has already been
criticised in a public judgment; she has been referred to the regulator and her conduct

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will be the subject of an investigation by her regulator. Fourthly, she is an extremely
junior lawyer who was apparently operating outside her level of competence and in a
difficult home and work context. Fifthly, our overarching concern is to ensure that
lawyers clearly understand the consequences (if they did not before) of using artificial
intelligence for legal research without checking that research by reference to
a uthoritative sources. This court’s decision not to initiate contempt proceedings in
res pect of Ms Forey is not a precedent. Lawyers who do not comply with their
professional obligations in this respect risk severe sanction.
70. Though Ms Forey has now been referred to her professional regulator by Ritchie J and
has also self - referred, we have decided that the court should also refer her to the
regulator . We consider that the following matters, at least, require further consideration
by the regulator:
The circumstances in which Ms Forey came to put false cases before HHJ Holmes
and before Ritchie J. The truthfulness of the account given by Ms Forey to Ritchie
J and in her witness statements. The circumstances in which her list of cases came
to be delete d, and whether it can now be retrieved. Whether those responsible for
supervising M s Forey’s pupillage in chambers complied with the relevant
regulatory requirements in respect of her supervision, the way in which work was
allocated to her, and her compete nce to undertake the level of work that she was
doing.
71. So far as Mr Amadigwe and the Haringey Law Centre are concerned, we accept that
they are an overstretched charity providing an important service to vulnerable members
of society with limited resources. It could be said however, that in those circumstances,
it is all the more important that professional standards are maintained, and they instruct
those who adhere to them. Moreover, so far as this particular case is concerned, it was
conducted with the ben efit of a legal aid certificate which provided funding for both
solicitors and counsel.
72. There is no basis however to sus pect that Mr Amadigwe deliberately caused false
material to be put before the court. There is no question of initiating contempt
proceedings in respect of him. He had, however, been put on notice as to what had
happened: the letter from the solicitor for t he local authority was clear. The steps taken
by Mr Amadigwe in response were inadequate. We refer the matter to the Solicitors
Regulation Authority. We consider the following matters at least requires further
consideration by the regulator: the steps taken by Mr Amadigwe in response to the
correspondence from Mr Greenberg; and the steps he took to satisfy himself that Ms
Forey had sufficient experience or was competent to undertake the work she had been
instructed by Haringey Law Centre to do .
The Al - Haroun case
The background
73. The claimant, Mr Al - Haroun, seeks damages of £89.4 million for alleged breaches of a
financing agreement. His solicitor is Abid Hussain of Primus Solicitors. The defendants
are the Qatar National Bank and QNB Capital. The defendants filed applications to
d ispute the court’s jurisdiction and to strike out the claim or to enter summary judgment.

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Directions were given for the hearing of those applications. In April 2025, Dias J
extended the time for the defendants to file and serve evidence in relation to the
applications. The claimant applied to set aside that order. He provided a witness
statemen t, and he also relied on a witness statement from his solicitor, Abid Hussain.
The parties agreed that the application did not require a hearing. On 9 May 2025, Dias
J dismissed the application. She referred the papers for consideration by the Hamid
j udge. She gave the following reasons:
“The court is deeply troubled and concerned by the fact that in
the course of correspondence with the court and in the witness
statements of both Mr Al - Haroun and Mr Hussain, reliance is
placed on numerous authorities, many of which appear to be
either completely fictitious or which, if they exist at all, do not
contain the passages supposedly quoted from them, or do not
support the propositions for which they are cited: see the
attached schedule of references prepared by one of the court’s
judicial assistants.

It goes without saying that this is a matter of the utmost
seriousness. Primus Solicitors are regulated by the SRA and Mr
Hussain is accordingly an officer of the court. As such, both he
and they are under a duty not to mislead or attempt to mislead
the co urt, either by their own acts or omissions or by allowing or
being complicit in the act or omissions of their client. The
administration of justice depends upon the court being able to
rely without question on the integrity of those who appear before
it an d on their professionalism in only making submissions
which can properly be supported.

Putting before the court supposed “authorities” which do not in
fact exist, or which are not authority for the propositions relied
upon is prima facie only explicable as either a conscious attempt
to mislead or an unacceptable failure to exercise reasonabl e
diligence to verify the material relied upon.

For these reasons, the court considers it appropriate to refer the
case for further consideration under the Hamid jurisdiction,
pending which all questions of costs are reserved.”
74. The schedule of references referred to by Dias J lists forty five citations that had been
put before the court. In eighteen instances, the case cited does not exist. In respect of
those cases that did exist, in many instances they did not contain the quotations that
were attributed to them, did not support the propositions for which they were cited, and
did not have any relevance to the subject matter of the application. In the judicial
assistant’s pith y conclusion “The vast majority of the authorities are made up or
misunderstood.”

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Evidence and submissions
75. Mr Al - Haroun, and Mr Hussain, have each filed a witness statement.
76. Mr Al - Haroun accepts responsibility for the inclusion of inaccurate and fictitious
material in the witness statement that he filed with the court. He says that the citations
were generated using publicly available artificial intelligence tools, legal searc h engines
and online sources. He had complete (but he accepts misplaced) confidence in the
authenticity of the material that he put before the court. He stresses that he did not intend
to misstate the law or to cause confusion to the court or the defendant s or his own legal
representatives. He offers a sincere apology to the court and to the defendants and to
his own legal representatives. He seeks to absolve his solicitor from any responsibility.
77. For his part, Mr Hussain accepts that his witness statement contained citations of non -
existent authorities. He says that he relied on legal research that Mr Al - Haroun had
conducted, without independently verifying the authorities. He accepts this was wron g.
He says that he has never before been called before a conduct hearing and has never
previously been reported to the Solicitors Regulation Authority. He has reported
himself, and he will send them a copy of his witness statement. He stresses that he had
no intention to mislead the court. In the light of what has happened he has removed
himself “from all litigated matters” and he will undertake a review of best practices
regarding legal drafting and the ethical duties of solicitors in the conduct of litiga tion,
and he will attend further continuous professional development training. He gives an
assurance that this will never happen again, and he offers an unreserved apology to the
court.
78. David Lonsdale, on behalf of Primus Solicitors and Mr Hussain, accepts that their
conduct “could not be worse”, that it is “very very bad indeed”, and that “the very last
thing any solicitor should do is to rely on the research of a lay client”. He says th at
Primus Solicitors and Mr Hussain were each “horrified” and that Mr Hussain could not
reproach himself more for what had happened. Mr Lonsdale draws attention to two
particular points in mitigation of what went wrong. First, it is obvious that Mr Hussain
had no idea that the citations and quotations were fake. Secondly, the documents had
been provided to counsel who had advised against making the application but who had
not drawn attention to the fact that the citations and quotations were fake. In all th e
circumstances (and particularly in the light of Mr Hussain’s self - referral to the
Solicitors Regulatory Authority) he submits that no further action is required.
Our conclusions
79. We note what Mr Al - H aroun says, his candour, his apology and his acceptance of
responsibility. We accept that he did not have any intention to mislead the court or
anyone else. However, the focus of our consideration of these cases is on the conduct
of the lawyers rather than the litigants. Mr Al - H aroun’s errors do not absolve his legal
representative s of responsibility. On the contrary, as Mr Lonsdale recognised, it is
extraordinary that the lawyer was relying on the client for the ........ .. ..... .....
research, rather than the other way around.
80. As to counsel who reviewed the material that had been drafted by Mr Al - Haroun, he
did not put the material before the court. Having formed an adverse view as to the merits

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of the application, and having communicated that view, and having apparently played
no further part in the matter, there is scope for argument as to whether he should have
advised on the ........ .. .. .. - ......’. ....... ......... ... ........... .. ....
not shown any contemporaneous note of the advice given by counsel (indeed we were
told in submissions that no attendance note had been taken of it), and there appears to
be a factual dispute as to the precise advice given. In all the circumstances, we do n ot
consider that the threshold for a court referral to the Bar Standards Board is met. That
does not, of course, prevent Mr Hussain from making a complaint, or from raising the
matter in explanation or mitigation before the regulator.
81. As to Mr Hussain, and Primus Solicitors, there was a lamentable failure to comply with
the basic requirement to check the ........ .. ........ .... .. ... ...... ... ...... .
lawyer is not entitled to rely on their lay client for the ........ .. ......... .. .........
or quotations that are contained in documents put before the court by the lawyer. It is
the lawyer’s professional responsibility to ensure the ........ .. .... ......... .. ...
satisfied that Mr Hussain did not realise the true position. It is striking that one of the
fake authorities that was cited to Dias J was a decision that was attributed to Dias J. If
this had been a deliberate attempt to mislead the court, it was always going to fail. The
threshold for the initiation of contempt proceedi ngs is, accordingly, not met. Mr
Hussain has referred himself to the Solicitors Regulation Authority. We will also make
a referral.
Further steps
82. We have set out some of the guidance that has been promulgated by the regulatory
bodies. These Hamid cases show that promulgating such guidance on its own is
insufficient to address the misuse of artificial intelligence . M ore needs to be done to
ensure that the guidance is followed and lawyers comply with their duties to the court.
A copy of this judgment will be sent to the Bar Council and the Law Society, and to the
Council of the Inns of Court. We invite them to consider as a matter of urgency what
furth er steps they should now take in the light of this judgment.

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Appendix
83. There have been many instances, in countries around the world, of material being put
before a court that is generated by an artificial intelligence tool, but which is erroneous.
The following selection (many more examples could be given) show something of the
extent of the problem.
England and Wales
84. In a case before the First - tier tribunal, SW Harber v Commissions for His Majesty’s
Revenue and Customs [2023] UKFTT 1007 (TC) , the appellant had disposed of a
property and failed to notify her liability to capital gains tax. She was issued with a
penalty. She appealed. She put before the tribunal the names, dates and summaries of
what were said to be nine First - tier Tribunal dec isions which supported her case. These
had been provided to her by “a friend in a solicitor’s office” who she had asked to assist
with her appeal. None of the authorities were genuine. At [18] to [19] the Tribunal said:
“18. The Tribunal told the parties that we… had looked at the
FTT website and other legal websites and had… been unable to
find any of the cases in the Response. We asked Mrs Harber if
the cases had been generated by an AI system, such as ChatGPT.
Mrs Harber said this was “possible”, but moved quickly on to
say t hat she couldn’t see that it made any difference, as there
must have been other FTT cases in which the Tribunal had
decided that a person’s ignorance of the law and/or mental health
condition provided a reasonable excuse.

19. Mrs Harber then asked how the Tribunal could be confident
that the cases relied on by HMRC and included in the Authorities
Bundle were genuine. The Tribunal pointed out that HMRC had
provided the full copy of each of those judgments and not simply
a su mmary, and the judgments were also available on publicly
accessible websites such as that of the FTT and the British and
Irish Legal Information Institute (“BAILLI”). Mrs Harber had
been unaware of those websites.”
85. In Olsen v Finansiel Stabilitet A/S [2025] EWHC 42 (KB) the appellants (who were
acting in person) appealed against a decision to register in the High Court a judgment
given by a Danish court for just over €5.8 million, plus about 1.25 million Danish
Kroner. The appellants relied on a case summary of an authority, with a neutral citation
indicating it was a decision of the Court of Appeal, which did not exist. Kerr J said the
summary was “ written in a style that made me think the author was a lawyer familia r
with the Judgments Regulation, but whose first language is not English .” The appellants
explained that they had been assisted by their “extensive legal network” who had
provided the case summary. They stressed that the “ key legal principles underpinning
the citation remain well - supported by established case law and statutory interpretation .”
Kerr J said, at [113]:

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“ I have narrowly and somewhat reluctantly come to the
conclusion that I should not cause a summons for contempt of
court to be issued to the appellants under CPR rule 81.6. I do not
think it likely that a judge (whether myself or another judge)
could be sur e, to the criminal standard of proof, that the
appellants knew the case summary was a fake. They may have
known but they could not be compelled to answer questions
about the identity of the person who supplied it. ”
86. In Zzaman v Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2025] UKFTT
00539 (TC) the appellant, who was acting in person, relied on artificial intelligence to
help him produce his written arguments. The resulting document included references
to a number of genuine cases, but the Tribunal found (at [19]) that none of the cases
that had been cited “materially assisted” and that (at [29]) they did not “provide
authority for the propositions that were advanced.” The Tribunal said:
“ This highlights the dangers of reliance on AI tools without
human checks to confirm that assertions the tool is generating
are accurate. Litigants using AI tools for legal research would be
well advised to check carefully what it produces and any
authoriti es that are referenced. These tools may not have access
to the authorities required to produce an accurate answer, may
not fully “understand” what is being asked or may miss relevant
materials. When this happens, AI tools may produce an answer
that seems plausible, but which is not accurate. These tools may
create fake authorities (as seemed to be the case in Harber ) or
use the names of cases to which it does have access but which
are not relevant to the answer being sought (as was the case in
this appeal). There is no reliable way to stop this, but the dangers
can be reduced by the use of clear prompts, asking the t ool to cite
specific paragraphs of authorities (so that it is easy to check if
the paragraphs support the argument advanced), checking to see
t he tool has access to live internet data, asking the tool not to
provide an answer if it is not sure and asking the tool for
information on the shortcomings of the case being advanced.
Otherwise there is a significant danger that the use of an AI tool
may lead to material being put before the court that serves no one
well, since it raises the expectations of litigants and wastes the
court’s time and that of opposing parties. ”
87. We agree with the Tribunal as to the dangers and the need for caution. We do not,
however, consider that the risks are materially reduced by “asking the tool not to
provide an answer if it is not sure and asking the tool for information on the
shortcomings of the case being advanced.” The critical safeguard is to check any output
by reference to an authoritative source.

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88. Bandla v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2025] EWHC 1167 (Admin) was decided
just a week before the hearing in these cases. The appellant appealed against a decision
of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal to strike him off the roll of solicitors. The
appellant cited twenty five cases which did not exist. He denied tha t he had used
artificial intelligence, but he accepted that he had not checked the citations. At [53]
Fordham J said:
“ I asked the Appellant why, in the light of this citation of non -
existent authorities, the Court should not of its own motion strike
out the grounds of appeal in this case, as being an abuse of the
process of the Court. His answer was as follows. He claimed that
the substance of the points which were being put forward in the
grounds of appeal were sound, even if the authority which was
being cited for those points did not exist. He was saying, on that
basis, that the citation of non - existent (fake) authorit ies would
not be a sufficient basis to concern the Court, at least to the extent
of taking that course. I was wholly unpersuaded by that answer.
In my judgment, the Court needs to take decisive action to
protect the integrity of its processes against any c itation of fake
authority. There have been multiple examples of fake authorities
cited by the Appellant to the Court, in these proceedings. They
are non - existent cases. Here, moreover, they have been put
forward by someone who was previously a practising s olicitor.
The citations were included, and maintained, in formal
documents before the Court. They were never withdrawn. They
were never explained. That, notwithstanding that they were
pointed out by the SRA, well ahead of this hearing. This, in my
judgment , constitutes a set of circumstances in which I should
exercise – and so I will exercise – the power of the Court to strike
out the grounds of appeal in this case as an abuse of process. ”
United States of America
89. In Mata v Avianca Inc Case No. 22 - cv - 1461 (PKC), 2o23 WL 4114965 (SDNY 22 June
2023) , a lawyer produced material before the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York which had been generated by ChatGPT. The opposing
lawyer, and the court, were unable to find seven of the cases that had been cited. The
court made a n order requiring the cases to be produced. The lawyer then provided what
purported to be excerpts from the cases. Rather than trying to locate the cases, the
lawyer had si mply asked ChatGPT to summarise the cases it had cited. It was apparent
that, as Judge Castel put it, these showed “stylistic and reasoning flaws that do not
generally appear in decisions issued by United States Courts of Appeals. Its legal
analysis is gib berish.” Judge Castel explained some of the consequences of citing non -
existent authorities:
“Many harms flow from the submission of fake opinions. The
opposing party wastes time and money in exposing the
deception. The Court’s time is taken from other important

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endeavors. The client may be deprived of arguments based on
authentic judicial precedents. There is potential harm to the
reputation of judges and courts whose names are falsely invoked
as authors of the bogus opinions and to the reputation of a party
attr ibuted with fictional conduct. It promotes cynicism about the
legal profession and the American judicial system. And a future
litigant may be tempted to defy a judicial ruling by
disingenuously claiming doubt about its authenticity.”
90. The judge imposed a sanction of $5,000 on each of two lawyers, and on the law firm.
91. In Ex parte Lee 673 SW 3d 755 (Tex App Waco 19 July 2023) non - existent cases were
cited to the Tenth Court of Appeals for the State of Texas. The court (Chief Justice
Gray, Justice Johnson and Justice Smith) “resist[ed] the temptation to issue a show
cause order… or report the attorney to the State Bar of Texas for a potential
investigation for a violation of the State Bar rules.”
92. In Kohls v Elison No 24 - cv - 3754 (D Minn 10 January 2025) the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota was concerned with a case concerning “deepfakes”.
The parties relied on expert evidence about artificial intelligence. One of the experts
had used generative artificial intelligence to draft h is report. It included citations of non -
existent academic articles. United States District Judge Laura Provinzino said:
“The irony. …a credentialed expert on the dangers of AI and
misinformation, has fallen victim to the siren call of relying too
heavily on AI – in a case that revolves around the dangers of AI,
no less.
…
The Court thus adds its voice to a growing chorus around the
country declaring the same message: verify AI - generated
content in legal submissions!”
93. Judge Provinzino also referred to Park v Kim 91 F 4th 610 (2d Cir 2023) (where the
court referred an attorney for potential discipline for including fake, artificial
intelligence generated , legal citations in a filing) and Kruse v Karlen 692 SW 3d 43
(Mo Ct App 2024) (where an appeal was dismissed because the litigant had filed a brief
with multiple fake, artificial intelligence generated , legal citations).
94. Lacey v State Farm General Insurance Co CV 24 - 5205 FMO (MAAx), 6 May 2025 , is
a judgment of Judge Wilner sitting in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California. The attorneys for the plaintiff submitted briefs that contained
“bogus” artificial intelligence generated research, comprising fake citation s and
quotations. When two of these were pointed out by the court, the brief was re - submitted
with those two corrected, but with many other fake citations and quotations still
include d. Judge Wilner referred to other cases where the same thing had happened, and
the need for “a fact - and circumstance - specific analysis” before deciding what type of
sanction to impose. He said:

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“the conduct of the lawyers at K&L Gates is also deeply
troubling. They failed to check the validity of the research sent
to them. As a result, the fake information found its way into the
Original Brief that I read. That’s bad. But, when I contacted them
a nd let them know about my concerns regarding a portion of their
research, the lawyers’ solution was to excise the phony material
and submit the Revised Brief – still containing a half - dozen AI
errors. Further, even though the lawyers were on notice of a
si gnificant problem with the legal research (as flagged by the
brief’s recipient: the Special Master), there was no disclosure to
me about the use of AI. Instead, the e - mail transmitting the new
brief merely suggested an inadvertent production error, not
imp roper reliance on technology. Translation: they had the
information and the chance to fix this problem, but didn’t take
it.”
95. Judge Wilner imposed litigation sanctions against the plaintiff and financial payments
from the lawyers. In the course of his judgment, Judge Wilner referred to yet further
instances of this issue: United States v Hayes (E.D. Cal. Jan 17, 2025) (sanctioning
criminal defence lawyer for using artificial intelligence; when questioned by the court,
the lawyer’s response about the source of inaccurate legal citations “was not accurate
and was misleading”); Saxena v Martinez Hernandez (D. Nev. April 23, 2025)
(“S axena’s use of AI generated cases – and his subsequent refusal to accept
responsibility for doing so – is just another example of Saxena’s abusive litigation
tactics, and further explains why the court issued case - terminating sanctions”); United
States v Cohen 724 F Supp 3d 251 (SDNY 2024) (declining to find bad faith where
defence lawyer voluntarily disclosed that she “had been ‘unable to verify’” false
citations in colleague’s brief and lawyer “would have withdrawn the [fake] citations
immediately if give n the opportunity”).
Australia
96. Valu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2G
95 was a case before the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia seeking judicial
review of a Tribunal decision. The written submissions filed by the applicant’s legal
representative contained citations of cases and quotations that were not genuine. Ju dge
Skaros referred the legal representative to the regulator. At [37], she said:
“ There is a strong public interest in referring this conduct to the
regulatory authority in NSW given the increased use of
generative AI tools by legal practitioners. The use of generative
AI in legal proceedings is a live and evolving issue. While the
Supreme Court of NSW has issued guidelines around the use of
generative AI, other Courts, includin g this Court, are yet to
develop their guidelines. The Court agrees with the Minister that
the misuse of generative AI is likely to be of increasing concern
and that there is a public interest in the OLSC being made aware
of such conduct as it arises. ”

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New Zealand
97. Wikeley v Kea Investments Ltd [2024] NZCA 609 concerned the enforcement of a
default judgment. The court (at [199] and footnote 187, per Muir J) noted that the
appellant withdrew a written argument “after the apparent use of generative artificial
intelligence in its drafting was drawn to our attention by respondent counsel”, that use
being apparent “from the references to apparently non - exi stent cases.” It drew attention
to guidance that had been issued by the judiciary as to the use of artificial intelligence
in the courts and tribunals.
Canada
98. Zhang v Chen [2024] BCSC 285 was a case before the Supreme Court of British
Columbia concerning parenting time with children. Ms Ke, the lawyer for the applicant,
filed a document which cited non - existent cases. She explained her mistake in a note to
a colleague:
“ I made a serious mistake when preparing a recent Notice of
Application for my client, Mr Wei Chen, by referring to two
cases suggested by Chat GTP (an artificial intelligent tool)
without verifying the source of information. I had no idea that
these two ca ses could be erroneous. After my colleague pointed
out the fact that these could not be located, I did research of my
own and could not detect the issues either. Regardless of the
level of reliability of Al aids, I should have used more reliable
platforms for doing legal research and should have verified the
source of information that was going to be presented in court
and/or exchanged with the opposing counsel. I have taken this
opportunity to review the relevant professional codes of conduct
and reflecte d on my action. I will not repeat the same mistake
again. I had no intention to mislead the opposing counsel or the
court and sincerely apologize for the mistake that I made. ”
99. Masuhara J said:
“ Citing fake cases in court filings and other materials handed up
to the court is an abuse of process and is tantamount to making a
false statement to the court. Unchecked, it can lead to a
miscarriage of justice. ”
100. He required Ms Ke to pay the costs of the additional effort and expense that had been
incurred because of the reliance on fake cases. He also required her to review all her
files that were before the court and to inform the court of any that contained cita tions
or summaries that were obtained from generative artificial intelligence tools.
101. Geismayr v The Owners, Strata Plan KAS 1970 [2025] BCCRT 217 was a case in the
Civil Resolution Tribunal in British Columbia in which the applicants sought

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retrospective approval for alterations made to a strata lot. Tribunal Member Peter
Mennie said, at [25]:
“The Geismayrs’ submissions reference ten decisions where
they say courts ruled that a strata could not force the removal of
strata lot alterations. These cases have the parties’ names and the
years published, but no legal citation. Nine of these cases do not
exist. The remaining case… has three court decisions published
in 2013, however, none of these are related to unauthorized
alterations. The Geismayrs listed the source of these cases as a
“Conversation with Copilot” which is an artificial intelligence
chatbot. I find it likely that these cases are “hallucinations”
where artificial intelligence generates false or misleading
results.”
102. In Ko v Li [2025] ONSC 2766 , a case before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, the
applicant sought to set aside a divorce order. Ms Lee, counsel for the applicant,
submitted a written document which cited non - existent cases. Myers J said, at [14] –
[22]:
“14. This occurrence seems similar to cases in which people have
had factums drafted by generative artificial intelligence
applications (like ChatGPT). Some of these applications have
been found to sometimes create fake legal citations that have
been dubbe d “hallucinations.” It appears that Ms. Lee’s factum
may have been created by AI and that before filing the factum
and relying on it in court, she might not have checked to make
sure the cases were real or supported the propositions of law
which she submit ted to the court in writing and then again orally.

15. All lawyers have duties to the court, to their clients, and to
the administration of justice.

16. It is the lawyer’s duty to faithfully represent the law to the
court.

17. It is the lawyer’s duty not to fabricate case precedents and
not to mis - cite cases for propositions that they do not support.

18. It is the lawyer’s duty to use technology, conduct legal
research, and prepare court documents competently.

19. It is the lawyer’s duty to supervise staff and review material
prepared for her signature.

20. It is the lawyer’s duty to ensure human review of materials
prepared by non - human technology such as generative artificial
intelligence.

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21. It should go without saying that it is the lawyer’s duty to read
cases before submitting them to a court as precedential
authorities. At its barest min imum, it is the lawyer’s duty not to
submit case authorities that do not exist or that stand for the
opposite of the lawyer’s submission.

22. It is the litigation lawyer’s most fundamental duty not to
mislead the court.”