Accesso

oppure

Dallo store:

La banca dati:

204 voci nel dizionario
1943 documenti
1445 temi
151 dossier

store
i prodotti

WPkit.it: privacy, formulari, check up per WordPress

eidas

2023-11-09 · NEW: Appunta · Stampa · pdf

Patrick-Breyer: the european digital identity in the new Eidas undermines browsers and the web

abstract:

La gestione dell'identità digitale, la carta d'identità europea, gestita dalla banca centrale europea, non piace ai pirati.

Il tema e' ancora ampiamente sottovalutato.

Fonte: Patrick-Breyer
Link: https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/eu-digital-identi

analisi:

L'analisi è riservata agli iscritti. Segui la newsletter dell'Osservatorio oppure il Podcast iscrizione gratuita 30 giorni

index:

Indice

La carta d'identità europea, gest

testo:

EU Digital Identity Regulation (eIDAS): Pirates don’t support blank cheque for surveillance of citizens online!

EUROPAPARLAMENT FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY AND TRANSPARENCY PRESS RELEASES

The EU Parliament and EU Council yesterday struck a political deal on the reform of the EU Digital Identity Regulation (eIDAS 2). A new digital identity wallet app is to allow EU citizens to access public and private digital services such as Facebook or Google, and pay online. The deal was made even though more than 500 scientists and numerous NGOs in an open letter „strongly warn against the currently proposed trilogue agreement, as it fails to properly respect the right to privacy of citizens and secure online communications“ – criticism which the Pirate Party Members of the European Parliament underline.

“This regulation is a blank cheque for surveillance of citizens online, endangering our privacy and security online”, comments Pirate Party lawmaker Patrick Breyer. “Browser security is being undermined, and overidentification will gradually erode our right to use digital services anonymously. Mark Zuckerberg should have no right to see our ID! Entrusting our digital lives to the government instead of Facebook and Google is jumping out of the frying pan and into the fire. This deal sacrifices essential requirements the European Parliament had put forward to make the eID app privacy-friendly and secure. The EU misses the opportunity to establish a trustworthy framework for modernization and digitization. We will watch the implementation very closely.”

Pirates Mikulas Peksa and Patrick Breyer worked until the last minute to try and fix at least some of the numerous risks of the EU digital identity scheme. In a major victory, Member States will not be obliged to assign a single unique ID number to every citizen. Signing up for the eID app will be voluntary, and it will remain possible to access public and private services by other existing identification and authentication means. The app client will be open source.

Overall though the scheme remains a blank cheque for surveillance of citizens online: As hundreds of scientists publicly warn and contrary to what the EU claims, web browser manufacturers could be forced to expose our securely encrypted Internet use (including intimate and sensitive activities) to government surveillance. This is an unacceptable attack on secure encryption. The eID apps can also be used to monitor our digital lives because there is no requirement of unobservability. The content of our eID wallets (potentially bringing together personal banking data, medical prescriptions and criminal records) could be monitored via central databases because we have no right to store documents exclusively on our personal devices.

The lure of conveniently signing in to private digital services using a single official eID app is a trap. Overidentification will gradually erode our right to use digital services anonymously which currently keeps us safe from criminal activity, unauthorised disclosure, identity theft, stalking and other forms of abuse of personal data. The eID app will not allow for multiple, truly separate user profiles which vulnerable persons rely on.

The server-side code of the eID wallet will not have to be open source, meaning the public cannot know what the code actually does and if it is safe.

In view of all this, the new EU eID app will not be trustworthy and will fail to sufficiently encourage the development of digital and eGovernment services in Europe – much to the Pirates regret.

See also the assessment of the deal published by NGO epicenter.works

---

The text beginning on the next page is an open letter on the position of scientists and

NGOs on the EU’s proposed digital identity reform.

As of the 8th November 2023, the letter has been signed by 504 scientists and

researchers from 39 countries, as well as numerous NGOs.

For press inquiries please contact:

Scientists

Juan Tapiador - jestevez@inf.uc3m.es (Spain)

Steven J. Murdoch - s.murdoch@ucl.ac.uk (UK)

Jaap-Henk Hoepman - jhh@cs.ru.nl (The Netherlands)

Anja Lehmann - anja.lehmann@hpi.de (Germany)

Peter Schwabe - peter@cryptojedi.org (Germany)

Cas Cremers - cremers@cispa.de (Germany)

René Mayrhofer - rm@ins.jku.at (Austria)

Manuel Barbosa - mbb@fc.up.pt (Portugal)

Raphael M. Reischuk - raphael.reischuk@zuehlke.com (Switzerland)

Gaëtan Leurent - gaetan.leurent@inria.fr (France)

Olivier Blazy - olivier.blazy@polytechnique.edu (France)

Stephen Farrell - stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie (Ireland)

TJ McIntyre - tjmcintyre@ucd.ie (Ireland)

Ivan Visconti - visconti@unisa.it (Italy)

Bart Preneel - bart.preneel@esat.kuleuven.be (Belgium)

Vashek Matyas - matyas@fi.muni.cz (Czech Republic)

Diego Aranha - dfaranha@cs.au.dk (Denmark)

Civil Society - NGOs

Thomas Lohninger - press@epicenter.works (Europe)

Alexis Hancock - alexis@eff.org (Worldwide)

For information on signing the letter, please see the end of this document.

Joint statement of scientists and NGOs on the EU’s proposed eIDAS reform

2nd November 2023

Dear Members of the European Parliament,

Dear Member States of the Council of the European Union,

We the undersigned are cybersecurity experts, researchers, and civil society organisations from

across the globe.

We have read the near-final text of the eIDAS digital identity reform which has been agreed on a

technical level in the trilogue between representatives from the European Parliament, Council

and Commission. We appreciate your efforts to improve the digital security of European citizens;

it is of utmost importance that the digital interactions of citizens with government institutions and

industry can be secure while protecting citizens’ privacy. Indeed, having common technical

standards and enabling secure cross-border electronic identity solutions is a solid step in this

direction. However, we are extremely concerned that, as proposed in its current form, this

legislation will not result in adequate technological safeguards for citizens and businesses, as

intended. In fact, it will very likely result in less security for all.

Last year, many of us wrote to you to highlight some of the dangers in the European

Commission’s proposed eIDAS regulation. After reading the near-final text, we are deeply

concerned by the proposed text for Article 45. The current proposal radically expands the ability

of governments to surveil both their own citizens and residents across the EU by providing them

with the technical means to intercept encrypted web traffic, as well as undermining the existing

oversight mechanisms relied on by European citizens. Concretely, the regulation enables each

EU member state (and recognised third party countries) to designate cryptographic keys for

which trust is mandatory; this trust can only be withdrawn with the government’s permission

(Article 45a(4)). This means any EU member state or third party country, acting alone, is

capable of intercepting the web traffic of any EU citizen and there is no effective recourse. We

ask that you urgently reconsider this text and make clear that Article 45 will not interfere with

trust decisions around the cryptographic keys and certificates used to secure web traffic.

Article 45 also bans security checks on EU web certificates unless expressly permitted by

regulation when establishing encrypted web traffic connections (Article 45(2a)). Instead of

specifying a set of minimum security measures which must be enforced as a baseline, it

effectively specifies an upper bound on the security measures which cannot be improved upon

without the permission of ETSI. This runs counter to well established global norms where new

cybersecurity technologies are developed and deployed in response to fast moving

developments in technology. This effectively limits the security measures that can be taken to

protect the European web. We ask that you reverse this clause, not limiting but encouraging the

development of new security measures in response to fast-evolving threats.

The current text also mentions in multiple places the need for the European Digital Identity

Wallet to protect privacy, including data minimization, and prevention of profiling. Yet, the

legislation still allows relying parties like governments and service providers to unnecessarily

link together and gain full knowledge about the uses of credentials in the new European Digital

Identity System. Given the broad intended uses of this system, which span all areas of life from

health, finance, commerce, online activity up to public transport, we believe that failing to require

both unlinkability and unobservability will severely compromise the privacy of EU citizens. Article

6a(7)(a) should be aligned with the negotiation mandate from the European Parliament lead

Industry Committee and thereby prevent technologically that such information can be obtained

by governments and other parties without the explicit consent of users. Article 6a(7a)(b) should

“mandate” instead of “enable” that interactions cannot be linked by relying parties or other

actors, where identification of the user is not mandatory. Lastly, forum-shopping from ‘Big Tech’

and other bad actors can only be prevented by a harmonised implementation of the Regulation

that allows national eIDAS agencies to be overruled should they fail to act.

Finally, we would like to highlight our frustration that decisions crucial for the security and

privacy of citizens, businesses, and governments, are being taken behind closed doors in

trilogue negotiations without public consultation of experts about the potential consequences of

the proposed regulations. We urge the European Parliament, Commission, and Council to

reconsider their legislative processes and commit to greater transparency so that experts and

the public can effectively contribute to the development of new regulations.1

In summary, we strongly warn against the currently proposed trilogue agreement, as it

fails to properly respect the right to privacy of citizens and secure online

communications; without establishing proper safeguards as outlined above, it instead

substantially increases the potential for harm.

1 T-540/15 - De Capitani v Parliament

1. Undermining website authentication undermines communications security

The current text of Article 45 mandates that browsers must accept any root certificates provided

by any Member State (and any third party country approved by the EU) and will have severe

consequences for the privacy of European citizens, the security of European commerce, and

the Internet as a whole.

Root certificates, controlled by so-called certificate authorities, provide the authentication

mechanisms for websites by assuring the user that the cryptographic keys used to authenticate

the website content belong to that website. The owner of a root certificate can intercept users’

web traffic by replacing the website’s cryptographic keys with substitutes he controls. Such a

substitution can occur even if the website has chosen to use a different certificate authority with

a different root certificate. Any root certificate trusted by the browser can be used to

compromise any website. There are multiple documented cases of abuse, because the

security of some certificate authorities has been compromised. To avoid this, there exists

legislation that regulates certificate authorities, complemented by public processes and

continuous vigilance by the security community to reveal suspicious activities.

The proposed eIDAS revision gives Member States the possibility of inserting root certificates at

will, with the aim to improve the digital security of European citizens by giving them new ways to

obtain authentic information of who operates a website. In practice, this does exactly the

opposite. Consider the situation in which one of the Member States (or any of the third party

states recognized now or in the future) were to add a new authority to the EU Trusted List. The

certificate would have to be immediately added to all browsers and distributed to all of their

users across the EU as a trusted certificate. By using the substitution techniques explained

above, the government-controlled authority would then be able to intercept the web traffic of

not only their own citizens, but all EU citizens, including banking information, legally

privileged information, medical records and family photos. This would be true even when visiting

non-EU websites, as such an authority could issue certificates for any website that all browsers

would have to accept. Additionally, although much of eIDAS2.0 regulation carefully gives

citizens the capability to opt out from usage of new services and functionality, this is not the

case for Article 45. Every citizen would have to trust those certificates, and thus every

citizen would see their online safety threatened.

Even if this misbehaviour was discovered, under the current proposal it would not be possible to

remove this certificate without the ultimate approval of the country having introduced the

certificate authority. Neither eIDAS’s article 45 nor any provisions in adjacent EU legislation

such as the NIS2 Directive provide any independent checks and balances on these decisions.

Further, European citizens do not have an effective way to appeal these decisions. This

situation would be unacceptably damaging to online trust and safety in Europe and across the

world. We believe this legislative text must be urgently reworked to avoid these serious

consequences by clarifying that eIDAS does not impose obligations to trust cryptographic keys

used for encrypted web traffic.

The proposed legislation also prevents the introduction of security checks when verifying the

certificates used for encrypted web traffic in Art 45, (2a). As written, this language requires that

the EU’s website certificates not be subjected to any mandatory requirements beyond those

specified in ETSI standards. Mandatory requirements on certificates are essential when

browsers validate certificates presented for use in encrypted web connections. Preventing these

additional security checks has no useful purpose and only hampers the improvement of

cybersecurity for European citizens. The detailed rules on certificate validation and display are

constantly being adapted based on new research results and consensus in the security

community. Existing security mechanisms, well-studied and accepted by the security community

at large, such as TLS 1.3 and certificate transparency logs currently enable browsers to quickly

adapt to changing threats and improve global web security. It is essential that this regulation

establishes a mandatory minimum set of security standards, but does not impose a limited set of

requirements which would hamper the adoption of new security technology within the EU.

While Article 45 could be understood as reducing the power of the large companies behind the

major web browsers, from a technical perspective, this is not the case. There already exists a

large number of certificate authorities capable of issuing certificates trusted in every web

browser, many of which are European and also recognised under the EU’s existing eIDAS

legislation. Websites have a free choice about which certificate authority they use and all of the

approved certificate authorities are treated equally in the browser. Should issues arise, the EU is

already well-equipped to tackle them through the recently passed Digital Markets Act, which

specifically identifies popular browsers and cloud services and bans self-preferencing behaviour

by gatekeepers. Article 45 itself does nothing to assist this process or to enable European

scrutiny of trust decisions by ‘Big Tech’, instead it only enables the interception of EU citizens’

web traffic by European governments. It further prevents concerned users, who may have

serious and substantiated concerns about being subject to state surveillance, from choosing, or

even creating, a browser that has stricter security checks.

In summary, this regulation allows misbehaviour by any individual Member State (or approved

third party countries) to compromise the safety and security of other Member State’s citizens. If

it is implemented, it would result in citizens having to, without a choice, trust all certificate

authorities defined by Member States (and recognized third countries) in addition to the parties

they trust today. This regulation does not eliminate any existing risk. Instead, by undermining the

existing secure web authentication processes, introduces new risks with no gain by European

citizens, businesses, and institutions. Moreover, if this regulation becomes a reality, it is only to

be expected that other countries will put pressure on browsers to obtain similar privileges

as EU Member States — as some have unsuccessfully attempted in the past — globally

endangering web security.

In order to address these concerns and avoid the security issues introduced by the current

legislation proposal which could result in incalculable damage, we recommend:

● The text be clarified to ensure that this legislation will not interfere with trust decisions

around the cryptographic keys or certificates used to secure web traffic and the

consequent impact on privacy and security of European citizens.

● Additional checks independent from those envisioned in the legislation are not only

permitted but encouraged to enable browsers to rapidly incorporate advances made by

the security community to improve the security of communications.

In particular:

● The re-introduction of text to Article 45 (2) limiting its scope: “Such recognition, support

and interoperability means solely that web-browsers shall ensure that the identity data

attested in the certificate provided using any of the methods is displayed in a

user-friendly manner.”

● The deletion of Article 45 (2a) so that new security checks can be implemented

effectively

● In Recital 32: Adding clarification that the obligations of recognition, interoperability and

support in Article 45 do not extend to the use of encryption and authentication

technologies for securing web traffic.

We also explicitly note that established processes clearly allow new certificate authorities to be

added to browser root trust stores; nation states wishing to establish a new CA legitimate and

lawful purposes need to go through the same security certification procedures that existing

authorities do, without requiring new regulation. Fostering the development of an EU-native

browser, or strengthening the supervision of certificate authorities across the EU, would have a

much more positive impact on the overall security of European citizens than attempting to

change the status quo of web security from within the eIDAS regulation.

2. A complex system only provides the security and privacy guarantees of its weakest

component

The European Digital Identity Wallet (EDIW) is designed to identify and authenticate users with

a high level of assurance. The Wallet includes identity information from national IDs (age, sex,

etc), and can be extended with additional attributes. These attributes could include very

sensitive information such as medical certificates, or important information for the future of

European citizens such as their professional qualifications. The eIDAS regulation foresees the

creation of an ecosystem of public and private entities that will benefit from the Wallet to have

access to certified personal information about citizens.

We welcome the provisions crafted in the legislation, which advocate for strong protections to

preclude tracking and profiling, that enable the option of revealing attributes in a selective

manner or via zero-knowledge attestation, that attribute providers should not learn about with

whom users share their attributes, or that mention that the wallet should allow for unlinkability

when identification is not needed. These are essential to promote the use of technologies that

can provide these properties by design, and we commend the legislators for including them.

Yet, the legislation only enables the existence of privacy-preserving technologies, but does not

mandate them (Article 6a(7a)(b)). We are concerned that this legal ambiguity could lead to a

deterioration of privacy-safeguards that ultimately leaves too much room for technical

implementation on member state level. Importantly, operators of the EDIW can still obtain

knowledge about concrete user behaviour even when the user has not consented to this. With a

privacy-respecting architecture such information is not necessary for the provision of the EDIW.

With the current legal text the architecture of the whole system risks undermining trust from

citizens in the whole system (Article 6a(7)). A fully harmonised European system for the benefit

of the private sector also needs a fully harmonised level of safeguards European citizens can

rely upon. Moreover, relying parties (service providers with access to the wallet) can also

‘Big Tech’ can exploit is the weakest of all Member States as we have seen with the GDPR and

DSA. This is particularly challenging because of the necessity of cross-border interoperability.

Hence, we recommend in Article 46e to empower the European Digital Identity Cooperation

Group to overrule the decisions of national eIDAS regulators in order to prevent the

circumvention of these important protections.

In order to address these concerns and avoid that the eIDAS regulation results in a new privacy

problem with no security gain in terms of authentication, we recommend:

● Make unlinkability a mandatory rather than optional requirement by Replacing “enable”

with “mandate” in Article 6a(7a)(b).

● Align the technical architecture with the strong protections established in the lead

Industry committee of the European Parliament in Article 6a(7).

● Provide a majority in the European Digital Identity Cooperation Group according to

Article 46e the power to overrule the decision of national eIDAS regulators in order to

ensure a harmonised enforcement of this regulation.

Without these necessary amendments the eIDAS regulation risks becoming a gift to Google and

other Big Tech actors. A European solution to the central question of handling sensitive identity

information needs to protect citizens against surveillance capitalism through strong technical

mechanisms and be resilient against attempts to exploit the regulatory system through

jurisdiction-shopping.

Signatures

Organisations

Associação de Empresas de Software Open Source Portuguesas (ESOP)

Associação Portuguesa para a Promoção da Segurança da Informação (AP2SI)

Asociatia pentru Tehnologie si Internet (ApTI)

Center for Democracy and Technology

Chaos Computer Club

Council of European Professional Informatics Societies

Defesa dos Direitos Digitais (D3)

deSEC

Digital Courage

Digitale Gesellschaft

Electronic Frontier Finland (Effi)

Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)

Emerald Onion

Entropia e.V.

Epicenter.works

European Digital Rights (EDRi)

Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR)

Homo Digitalis

Innovationsverbund Öffentliche Gesundheit e.V.

Internet Governance Project

Internet Society

Internet Society Catalan Chapter

Internet Society Switzerland Chapter

Internet Society UK Chapter

IT-Pol

La Quadrature du Net

Özgür Yazılım Derneği

Petites Singularités

Privacy & Access Council of Canada

Privacy First

Rhizomatica

SICEH Foundation

SUPERRR Lab

The Digital Freedom and Rights Association

The Document Foundation

The Matrix.org Foundation

The Syncthing Foundation

The Tor Project

Trust in Digital Life

Scientists and Researchers

The letter has been signed by 504 scientists and researchers from 39 countries.

Australia

Dr. Shaanan Cohney University of Melbourne

Austria

Prof. Elena Andreeva TU Wien

Dr. Gaëtan Cassiers Graz University of Technology

Prof. Maria Eichlseder Graz University of Technology

Prof. Daniel Gruss Graz University of Technology

Prof. Martina Lindorfer TU Wien

Univ.-Prof. Dr. Matteo Maffei TU Wien

Univ.-Prof. Dr. René Mayrhofer Johannes Kepler University Linz

Dr. Peter Meerwald-Stadler Universität Salzburg

Dr. Martin Riener TU Wien

Dr. Michael Roland Johannes Kepler University Linz

Dr. Marco Squarcina TU Wien

Univ.-Prof. Dr. Edgar Weippl Universität Wien

Belgium

Dr. Aysajan Abidin KU Leuven

Prof. Olivier Bonaventure UCLouvain

Prof. Bart Coppens Ghent University

Dr. Lesly-Ann Daniel KU Leuven

Prof. Geert Deconinck KU Leuven

Prof. Claudia Diaz KU Leuven

Dr. Benedikt Gierlichs KU Leuven

Prof. Gregory Lewkowicz Université libre de Bruxelles

Prof. Jan Tobias Muehlberg Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Cybersecurity Research

Centre

Dr. Svetla Nikova KU Leuven

Prof. Olivier Pereira UCLouvain

Prof. Thomas Peters UCLouvain

Prof. Bart Preneel KU Leuven

Prof. Jean-Jacques Quisquater UCLouvain

Prof. Florentin Rochet UNamur

Prof. Nigel Smart KU Leuven

Prof. Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon VUB

Prof. François-Xavier Standaert Université catholique de Louvain

Prof. Mathy Vanhoef KU Leuven

Prof. Ingrid Verbauwhede KU Leuven

Dr. Karin Verelst Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Dr. Plixavra Vogiatzoglou KU Leuven Centre for IT & IP Law

Brazil

Prof. Marcos A. Simplicio Jr. Universidade de São Paulo

Dr. Ian Brown Visiting Professor, Fundação Getulio Vargas

Prof. Emerson Ribeiro de Mello Federal Institute of Santa Catarina

Prof. Frederico Schardong Instituto Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

Bulgaria

Dr. Vesselin Bontchev Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

Dr. Konstantin Delchev IMI-BAS

Canada

Prof. Diogo Barradas University of Waterloo

Prof. Claude Crépeau McGill University

Prof. Ian Goldberg University of Waterloo

Mr Mark Lizar CEO 0PN Transparency Lab

Prof. Simon Oya The University of British Columbia

Prof. Joel Reardon University of Calgary

Dr. Stacey Watson University of Waterloo

Paul Wouters The Libreswan Project

Chile

Prof. Alejandro Hevia Universidad de Chile

China

Prof. Dr.-Ing. Dirk Kutscher The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

(Guangzhou)

Czech Republic

Vlad Iliushin ELLIO Technology

Jan Jancar Masaryk University

Prof. Vashek Matyas Masaryk University

Prof. Petr Svenda Masaryk Uninversity

Dr. Martin Ukrop Masaryk University

Denmark

Prof. Diego F. Aranha Aarhus University

Prof. Carsten Baum Technical University of Denmark

Prof. Ivan Damgård Aarhus University

Prof. Dr. Florian Echtler Aalborg University

Peter Kruse SIE Europe

Prof. Christian Majenz Technical University of Denmark

Prof. Claudio Orlandi Aarhus University

Prof. Peter Scholl Aarhus University

Dr. Shreyas Srinivasa Aalborg University

Finland

Prof. N. Asokan University of Waterloo and Aalto University

Prof. Christopher Brzuska Aalto University

Dr. Lars Eggert NetApp

Dr. Lachlan Gunn Aalto University

Prof. Kimmo Halunen University of Oulu

Prof. Antti Honkela University of Helsinki

Dr. Michael Klooß Aalto University

Prof. Russell W. F. Lai Aalto University

France

Dr. Valérie Berthé CNRS

Dr. Daniele Antonioli EURECOM

Prof. Simone Aonzo EURECOM

Florent Autréau Université Grenoble Alpes

Prof. Jean Claude Bajard Sorbonne Université

Prof. Davide Balzarotti EURECOM

Dr. Gustavo Banegas Independent Researcher

Dr. Sébastien Bardin Université Paris-Saclay, CEA

Dr. Sonia Belaïd CryptoExperts

Prof. Thierry Berger University of Limoges

Mr. Karthikeyan Bhargavan Cryspen

Dr. Bruno Blanchet Inria

Prof. Olivier Blazy Ecole Polytechnique

Dr. Xavier Bonnetain Inria

Dr. Isabelle Le Brun Université grenoble alpes

Dr. Olivier Buffet INRIA

Prof. Sébastien Canard Télécom Paris

Dr. Anne Canteaut Inria

Dr. Thibault Cholez Université de Lorraine

Dr. Véronique Cortier CNRS

Dr. Clément Dallard École Normale Supérieure de Lyon

Dr. Alexandre Debant Inria

CR. Thomas Debris-Alazard Inria

Dr. Daniel Demmler Zama

Dr. Jean-Christophe Deneuville ENAC, Université de Toulouse

Dr. Patrick Derbez Université de Rennes

Dr. Julien Deseigne Emlyon business school

Prof. Matthieu Dien Université de Caen

Dr. Jannik Dreier Université de Lorraine

Dr. Cyril Drocourt Université de Picardie Jules Verne

Dr. Sébastien Duval Université de Lorraine, Loria, CNRS, Inria

Dr. Christoph Egger Université Paris Cité, CNRS, IRIF

Dr. Antonio Faonio EURECOM

Prof. Jessica Feldman American University of Paris

Prof. Barbara Fila IRISA, INSA Rennes

Prof. Caroline Fontaine CNRS

Prof. Aurélien Francillon EURECOM

Dr. Aymeric Fromherz Inria

Prof. Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro Institut Mines-Telecom

Dr. Pierrick Gaudry CNRS

Dr. Louis Gesbert Inria

Dr. Lénaïck Gouriou ENS

Dr. Michaël Hauspie Université de Lille

Dr. Vincent Hugot INSA Centre Val de Loire

Dr. Charlie Jacomme Inria

Dr. Nesrine Kaaniche Telecom SudParis, Institut Polytechnique de Paris

Prof. Marc-Olivier Killijian UQAM/CNRS

Dr. Nadim Kobeissi Symbolic Software

Dr. Adrien Koutsos Inria Paris

Dr. Steve Kremer Inria

Prof. Pascal Lafourcade University Clermont Auvergne (LIMOS)

Dr. Joseph Lallemand CNRS

Philippe Langlois P1 Security

Dr. Vincent Laporte Inria Nancy

Prof. Maryline Laurent Télécom SudParis

Dr. Vincent Lefèvre Inria

MCF Joël Legrand CentraleSupélec

Dr. Gaëtan Leurent Inria

Dc Claire Levallois-Barth IMT Atlantique

Prof. Francoise Levy INRIA

Dr. Benoît Libert Zama

Prof. Nadia EL MRABET Mines Saint Etienne

Prof. (Honorary) Traian MUNTEAN Aix-Marseille Université

Dr. Damien Marion University of Rennes

Dr. Stephan Merz Inria Nancy

Dr. Brice Minaud Inria and ENS-PSL

Dr. Camille Monière Université Bretagne Sud

Dr. María Naya-Plasencia Inria

Prof. Benjamin Nguyen INSA Centre Val de Loire

Dr. Phong Nguyen Inria

Dr. Andrea Oliveri EURECOM

Dr. Charles Olivier-Anclin LIMOS

Dr. Cristina Onete Université de Limoges

Dr. Léo Perrin Inria

Dr. Tamara Rezk INRIA

Dr. Matthieu Rivain CryptoExperts

Dr. Léo Robert Université de Picardie Jules Verne

Dr. Thomas Roche NinjaLab

Prof. Christophe Rosenberger ENSICAEN

Dr. Yann Rotella Université Paris-Saclay

Dr. Merve Sahin

Hervé Schauer HS2

Dr. Jacques André Fines Schlumberger Université Panthéon Assas Paris 2

Dr. André Schrottenloher Inria

Dr. Benjamin Smith Inria and École polytechnique

Dr. Valentin Suder University of Rouen Normandy

Dr. Emmanuel Thomé Inria

Dr. Jean-Pierre Tillich Inria

Dr. Michael Toth

Prof. Yannick Toussaint LORIA

Dr. Alexandre Wallet Inria, Centre de l'Université de Rennes

Prof. Melek Önen EURECOM

Germany

Dr. Ali Abbasi CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Prof. Dr. Florian Adamsky Hof University od Applied Sciences

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Michael Backes CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Prof. Gilles Barthe Max Planck Institute for Security and privacy (MPI-SP)

Dr.-Ing. Olaf Bergmann Universität Bremen, TZI

Privatdozent Dr. Roland Bless Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Prof. Dr. Kevin Borgolte Ruhr University Bochum

Prof. Dr.-Ing. Carsten Bormann Universität Bremen, TZI

Dr. Jacqueline Brendel TU Darmstadt

Dr. Samira Briongos NEC Laboratories Europe

Prof. Dr. Stefan Brunthaler uCSRL - FI Code - Universität der Bundeswehr

München

Dr.-Ing. Jiska Classen Hasso Plattner Institute, University of Potsdam

Prof. Dr. Cas Cremers CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Dr. Aurore Fass CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Jens Finkhaeuser Interpeer gUG

Dr. Oliver Gasser Max Planck Institute for Informatics

Dr.-Ing. Stefane Gerdes Universität Bremen, TZI

Dr. Maximilian Golla CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Dr. Lorenzo Grassi Ruhr-University Bochum

Werner Haas Cyberus Technology GmbH

Prof. Dr. Andreas Heinemann Hochschule Darmstadt / ATHENE - National Research

Center for Applied Cybersecurity

Dr.-Ing. Dominik Helm Technische Universität Darmstadt

Prof. Dr. Dominik Herrmann Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg

Prof. Dr. Peter Hertkorn Hochschule Reutlingen

Prof. Dr. Matthias Hollick TU Darmstadt

Prof. Thorsten Holz CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Prof. Ralph Holz University of Münster

Dr. Detlef Hühnlein ecsec GmbH

Prof. Dr. Luigi Lo Iacono H-BRS University of Applied Sciences

Dr. Fabian Ising Fraunhofer SIT, FH Münster

Prof. Tibor Jager University of Wuppertal

Dr. Heiko Jakubzik Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg

Prof. Dr. Antoine Joux CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Prof. Dr. Stefan Katzenbeisser University of Passau

Dr. Franziskus Kiefer Cryspen

Jörg Knappen Saarland University

Dr. Konrad Kohbrok Phoenix R&D

Prof. Dr. Christoph Krauß Darmstadt University of Applied Sciences

Dr. Katharina Krombholz CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Roman Kuznetsov Systola GmbH

Dr. Robert Künnemann CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Prof. Gregor Leander Ruhr University Bochum

Prof. Anja Lehmann Hasso-Plattner-Institute, University of Potsdam

Dr. Christoph Lenzen CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Dr. Wouter Lueks CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Dr. Matthias Minihold Ruhr University Bochum

Prof. Esfandiar Mohammadi University of Lübeck

Dr. Veelasha Moonsamy Ruhr University Bochum

Prof. Dr.-Ing. Jörg Ott Technical University of Munich

Dr. Sebastian Pape Social Engineering Academy

Dr. Giancarlo Pellegrino CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Prof. Dr. Guenther Pernul University of Regensburg

Prof. Dr. Joachim Posegga University of Passau

Dr. Henrich C. Pöhls University of Passau

Prof. Dr. Kai Rannenberg Goethe University Frankfurt

Dr. Rainer Rehak Weizenbaum Institute for the Networked Society

Prof. Dr. Konrad Rieck Technische Universität Berlin

Prof. Dr. Stefanie Roos University of Kaiserslautern-Landau

Prof. Dr. Christian Rossow CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Dr.-Ing. Tim Ruffing Blockstream Research

Prof. Dr. Florian E. Sachs University of Cologne

Dr. Martin Schanzenbach Fraunhofer AISEC

Prof. Dr. Sebastian Schinzel Münster University of Applied Sciences and

Fraunhofer SIT and Athene

Prof. Thomas Schneider TU Darmstadt

Dr. Jonas Schneider-Bensch Cryspen

Prof. Dr.-Ing. Thomas Schreck Munich University of Applied Sciences

Prof. Dominique Schröder Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

Prof. Dr. Peter Schwabe MPI-SP & Radboud University

Dr. Patrick Schweitzer FernUniversität Hagen

Prof. Dr. Jörg Schwenk Ruhr University Bochum

Prof. Dr. Marcus Schöller Reutlingen University

Dr. Lea Schönherr CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

PD Dr. Karsten Sohr Center for Computing Technologies at the University of

Bremen

Dr.-Ing. Ben Stock CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Prof. Dr. Thorsten Strufe KIT and CeTI TU-Dresden

Dr. Nils Ole Tippenhauer CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Dr. Oleksandr Tkachenko DFINITY

Prof. Dr. Peter Trapp Hochschule München

Dr.-Ing. Amos Treiber

Dr.-Ing. Tobias Urban Westphalian University of Applied Sciences & Institute

for Internet Security

Dr. Anjo Vahldiek-Oberwagner Intel Labs

Prof. Jilles Vreeken CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Dr. Christiane Weis NEC Laboratories Europe (views are my own)

Prof. Dr. Matthias Wählisch TU Dresden

Prof. Dr. Yuval Yarom Ruhr University Bochum

Greece

Prof. Stefanos Gritzalis University of Piraeus

Prof. Sotiris Ioannidis Technical University of Crete

Prof. Christos Kalloniatis University of the Aegean

Prof. Georgios Kambourakis University of the Aegean

Prof. Spyridon Kokolakis University of the Aegean

Prof. Costas Lambrinoudakis University of Piraeus

Hong Kong SAR, China

Dr. Xavier de Carné de Carnavalet The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Hungary

Dr. Balazs PEJO CrySyS Lab

Iceland

Mr. Stefán Jökull Sigurðarson Have I Been Pwned Contributor, Microsoft MVP

Prof. Thomas Welsh University of iceland

Ireland

Dr. Stephen Farrell Trinity College Dublin

Dr. Aikaterini Kanta University College Dublin

Prof. Douglas Leith Trinity College Dublin

Prof. David Malone Maynooth University

Dr. TJ McIntyre University College Dublin, Sutherland School of Law

Dr. Hazel Murray Munster Technological University

Dr. Kris Shrishak Irish Council for Civil Liberties

Israel

Prof. Orr Dunkelman Computer Science Dept. and the Center for Cyber,

Law and Policy at the University of Haifa

Dr. Eyal Ronen Tel Aviv University

Dr. Mahmood Sharif Tel Aviv University

Italy

Prof. Alessandro Barenghi Politecnico di Milano

Dr. Antonia Bezenchek INFORMAPRO, Rome

Prof. Carlo Blundo University of Salerno

Dr. Daniele Cono D'Elia Sapienza University of Rome

Dr. Matteo Dell'Amico University of Genoa

Dr. Salvatore Manfredi Fondazione Bruno Kessler

Dr. Emmanuela Orsini Bocconi University

Prof. Stefano Paraboschi University of Bergamo

Prof. Silvio Ranise Università di Trento and Fondazione Bruno Kessler,

Trento

Filippo Valsorda

Prof. Daniele Venturi Sapienza University of Rome

Prof. Ivan Visconti University of Salerno

Prof. Stefano Zanero Politecnico di Milano

Japan

Prof. Masayuki Hatta Surugadai University

Dr. Octavio Perez Kempner NTT Social Informatics Laboratories

Prof. Toshimaru Ogura JCA-NET

Prof. Kazue Sako Waseda University

Dr. Mehdi Tibouchi NTT Social Informatics Laboratories

Latvia

Dr. Pēteris Paikens University of Latvia

Liechtenstein

Prof. Giovanni Apruzzese University of Liechtenstein

Luxembourg

Dr. Afonso Arriaga University of Luxembourg

Prof. Gilbert Fridgen University of Luxembourg

Dr. Dmitry Khovratovich Ethereum Foundation

Dr. Baptiste Lambin University of Luxembourg

Dr. Johannes Müller University of Luxembourg

Dr. Claudia Negri-Ribalta President of OptIA and researcher at the University of

Luxembourg

Dr. Peter Roenne University of Luxembourg

Prof. Peter Y A Ryan University of Luxembourg

Dr. Johannes Sedlmeir Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and

Trust, University of Luxembourg

Mauritius

Loganaden Velvindron cyberstorm.mu

New Zealand

Dr. Vladimir Mencl Research and Education Advanced Network New

Zealand

Norway

Prof. Anamaria Costache NTNU

Prof. Kristian Gjøsteen NTNU

Prof. Nils Gruschka University of Oslo

Prof. Tjerand Silde Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Prof. Iain Sutherland Noroff University College

Prof. Mohsen Toorani University of South-Eastern Norway

Prof. Dr. Michael Welzl University of Oslo

Poland

Prof. Miroslaw Kutylowski NASK - National Research Institute

Portugal

Prof. Manuel Barbosa Faculty of Science of the University of Porto

Sofia Celi Brave

Prof. Alex Davidson Universidade NOVA de Lisboa

Prof. Kevin Gallagher NOVA School of Science and Technology

Prof. Nuno Santos INESC-ID / Instituto Superior Técnico, University of

Lisbon

Singapore

Prof. Thomas Peyrin Nanyang Technological University

Slovenia

Prof. Marko Hölbl University of Maribor, Faculty of Electrical Engineering

and Computer Science

Spain

Dr. Jorge Blasco Alis Universidad Politécnica de Madrid

Dr. Juan Caballero IMDEA Software Institute

Dr. Ignacio Cascudo IMDEA Software Institute

Prof. Jordi Domingo Universitat Politècnica de Catlaunya (UPC

BarcelonaTECH)

Prof. Josep Domingo-Ferrer Universitat Rovira i Virgili

Prof. Luis Fernández-Sanz Universidad de Alcalá

Dr. Dario Fiore IMDEA Software Institute

Prof. José María de Fuentes Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Dr. David Arroyo Guardeño Spanish National Research Council

Prof. Marco Guarnieri IMDEA Software Institute

Dr. Jordi Herrera-Joancomartí Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Prof. Lorena González Manzano Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Dr. Pedro Moreno-Sanchez IMDEA Software Institute

Dr. Gorka Guardiola Múzquiz Universidad Rey Juan Carlos

Prof. Antonio Nappa UC3M Madrid

Prof. Jose A. Onieva University of Malaga

Dr. Sergio Pastrana University Carlos III de Madrid

Prof. Fernando Pérez-González University of Vigo

Prof. Ricardo J. Rodríguez Universidad de Zaragoza

Dr. Carla Ràfols Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Prof. Enrique Soriano-Salvador Universidad Rey Juan Carlos

Dr. Guillermo Suarez-Tangil IMDEA Networks Institute

Prof. Juan Tapiador Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Dr. Ida Tucker Indra

Prof. Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez IMDEA Networks Institute

Prof. María Isabel González Vasco Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Sweden

Dr. Michele Cascella Lund University

Dr. Felix Engelmann Lund University

Prof. Dr.-Ing. Meiko Jensen Karlstad University

Dr. Leonardo Martucci Karlstad University

Dr. Tobias Pulls Karlstad University

Switzerland

Prof. David Basin ETH Zurich

Dr. ir. Bram Bonné Google

Prof. Christian Cachin University of Bern

Prof. Srdjan Capkun ETH Zurich

Antonios Chariton

Dr. Anastasija Collen University of Geneva

Dr. Aisling Connolly DFINITY

Dr. Olivier Crochat EPFL

Dr. Damien Desfontaines Tumult Labs (views my own)

Prof. Bryan Ford EPFL

Dr. Tommaso Gagliardoni Kudelski Security (views are my own)

Dr. Giacomo Giuliari ETH Zurich

Prof. Dr. Christian Grothoff Bern University of Applied Sciences

Prof. Andreas Habegger Bern University of Applied Sciences

Dr. Harry Halpin Nym Technologies

Prof. Jean-Pierre Hubaux EPFL

Prof. Lukas Ith Bern University of Applied Sciences

Prof. Ralf Jung ETH Zurich

Prof. Marc Langheinrich Università della Svizzera italiana (USI)

Prof. Dr. Annett Laube-Rosenpflanzer Bern University of Applied Science (BFH)

Dr. Markus Legner Mysten Labs

Prof. Rebekah Overdorf University of Lausanne

Prof. Kenneth Paterson ETH Zurich

Prof. Mathias Payer EPFL

Prof. Dr. Adrian Perrig ETH Zürich

Prof. Kaveh Razavi ETH Zurich

Dr. Raphael M. Reischuk National Test Institute for Cybersecurity; Zühlke

Engineering AG

Prof. Dr. Kenneth A. Ritley Bern University of Applied Sciences

Dr. Lutz Rosenpflanzer Berne University of Applied Sciences / BFH

Dr. Benjamin Rothenberger Zühlke

Dr. Alessandro Sorniotti IBM Research Europe (views are my own)

Prof. Carmela Troncoso EPFL

Dr. Piet De Vaere ETH Zürich

Dr. Rob van Weelderen CERN

Dr. Taras Zakharko University of Zurich

Taiwan

Dr. Matthias Kannwischer

The Netherlands

Dr. Gunes Acar Radboud University

Dr. Luca Allodi TU Eindhoven

Dr. Greg Alpár Open University of the Netherlands

Prof. Dr. H. Bos VUSec / Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Dr. Léo Colisson CWI

Dr. Andrea Continella University of Twente

Prof. Joan Daemen Radboud University

Prof. Sandro Etalle Eindhoven Technical University

Dr. Simona Etinski Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica

Dr. Seda Gurses TU Delft

Prof. Dr. Jaap-Henk Hoepman Radboud University / University of Groningen /

Karlstad University

Prof. Andreas Hülsing Eindhoven University of Technology

Dr. Ralph Koning University of Amsterdam

Dr. Matthijs Koot University of Amsterdam

Prof. Dr. Tanja Lange Eindhoven University of Technology

Drs. Jaap van der Straaten MBA Chief Executive Officer Civil Registration Centre for

Development

Dr. Luca Mariot University of Twente

Prof. Giovane C. M. Moura TU Delft

Dr. Simona Samardjiska Radboud University

Prof. Christian Schaffner University of Amsterdam

Dr. Savio Sciancalepore TU Eindhoven

Prof. Georgios Smaragdakis Delft University of Technology (TU Delft)

Dr. Monika Trimoska Eindhoven University of Technology

Dr. Jeroen van der Ham-de Vos University of Twente

Dr. Yury Zhauniarovich TU Delft

Turkey

Prof. Cihangir Tezcan Middle East Technical University

United Arab Emirates

Prof. Christina Pöpper New York University Abu Dhabi

United Kingdom

Prof. Martin Albrecht King's College London

Prof. Ross Anderson Universities of Edinburgh and Cambridge

Prof. David Aspinall University of Edinburgh

Prof. Ioana Boureanu Surrey Centre for Cyber Security, University of Surrey

Prof. Achim Brucker University of Exeter

Prof. Lorenzo Cavallaro University College London

Dr. Giovanni Cherubin Microsoft

Prof. Tom Chothia University of Birmingham

Dr. Michele Ciampi The University of Edinburgh

Dr. Richard Clayton University of Cambridge

Dr. Kovila Coopamootoo King's College London

Ray Corrigan The Open University

Dr. Elizabeth Crites University of Edinburgh

Prof. Jon Crowcroft University of Cambridge

Prof. Simon Dobson University of St Andrews

Dr. Benjamin Dowling The University of Sheffield

Dr. Tariq Elahi University of Edinburgh

Prof. Hamed Haddadi Imperial College London

Dr. Neil Hanley Queen's University Belfast

Mr Scott Helme Independent Security Researcher

Dr. Michio Honda School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh

Prof. Alice Hutchings University of Cambridge

Dr. Rikke Bjerg Jensen Royal Holloway, University of London

Dr. Philipp Jovanovic University College London

Dr. Marc Juarez University of Edinburgh

Prof. Vasilis Katos BU-CERT, Bournemouth University

Prof. Aggelos Kiayias University of Edinburgh

Prof. Markulf Kohlweiss University of Edinburgh

Prof. Douwe Korff Emeritus professor London Metropolitan University

Prof. Andrew Martin University of Oxford

Prof. Sarah Meiklejohn University College London

Prof. Andrew W Moore University of Cambridge

Alec Muffett Security Consultant

Prof. Steven J. Murdoch University College London

Dr. David Nadlinger University of Oxford

Prof. Bill Buchanan OBE Edinburgh Napier University

Dr. Oleksii Oleksenko Azure Research

Dr. Colin Perkins University of Glasgow

Dr. Fabio Pierazzi King's College London

Dr. Sasa Radomirovic University of Surrey

Prof. Kasper Rasmussen University of Oxford

Prof. Moritz Riede University of Oxford

Dr. Luc Rocher University of Oxford

Prof. Steve Schneider Surrey Centre for Cyber Security, University of Surrey

Dr. Andrei Serjantov

Dr. Siamak Shahandashti University of York

Prof. Peter Sommer Birmingham City University

Dr. Ian Stark The University of Edinburgh

Dr. Yiannis Tselekounis Royal Holloway, University of London

Prof. Dr. Luca Viganò King's College London

Dr. Mikhail Volkhov The University of Edinburgh

Dr. Christian Weinert Royal Holloway, University of London

Prof. Alan Woodward Surrey Centre for Cyber Security, University of Surrey

United States of America

Dr. Clément Aubert Augusta University

Prof. Lujo Bauer Carnegie Mellon University

Prof. Joseph Bonneau New York University

Prof. Mahdi Cheraghchi University of Michigan

Dr. Omar Haider Chowdhury Stony Brook University

Prof. Nicolas Christin Carnegie Mellon University

Prof. Lorrie Cranor CyLab Security and privacy Institute, Carnegie Mellon

University

Prof. Álvaro Cárdenas UCSC

Prof. Sanchari Das University of Denver

Prof. Zakir Durumeric Stanford University

Arthur Edelstein PrivacyTests.org

Dr. Christina Garman Purdue University

Dr. Joseph Lorenzo Hall Internet Society

Prof. Umar Iqbal Washington University in St. Louis

Prof. Gabriel Kaptchuk Boston University

Mallory Knodel Internet Research Steering Group member

Prof. Susan Landau Tufts University

Dr. Per Larsen Immunant, Inc.

Prof. Milton L Mueller Georgia Institute of Technology

Prof. Adwait Nadkarni William & Mary

Prof. Nick Nikiforakis Stony Brook University

Prof. Riccardo Paccagnella Carnegie Mellon University

Christopher Patton

Prof. Michalis Polychronakis Stony Brook University

Dr. Niels Provos

Prof. Amir Rahmati Stony Brook University

Prof. Aanjhan Ranganathan Northeastern University

Prof. Ronald L. Rivest MIT

Prof. Mike Rosulek Oregon State University

Dr. Phillipp Schoppmann Google

Dr. Sergi Delgado Segura Chaincode Labs

Prof. Hovav Shacham The University of Texas at Austin

Prof. Micah Sherr Georgetown University

Dr. David Sidi The University of Arizona & Yale University

Prof. Michael A. Specter Georgia Tech

Prof. Deian Stefan University of California San Diego

Prof. Santiago Torres-Arias Purdue University

Prof. Blase Ur University of Chicago

Prof. Matthew Wright Rochester Institute of Technology

Dr. Pieter Wuille Chaincode Labs

Prof. Daniel Zappala Brigham Young University

Signing the letter

If you are a scientist or researcher and want to sign please fill out this form hosted by the Chaos

Computer Club of Vienna (PhD or demonstrated research track record required).

If you are a representative of an NGO, you can sign via adding your organisation to this

spreadsheet also hosted by the Chaos Computer Club of Vienna.

Link: https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/eu-digital-identi

Testo del 2023-11-09 Fonte: Patrick-Breyer

Eidas Did Sorveglianza Browser Chatcontrol

Commenta

i commenti sono anonimi e inviati via mail e cancellati dopo aver migliorato la voce alla quale si riferiscono: non sono archiviati; comunque non lasciare dati particolari. Si applica la privacy policy.

Newsletter

Nota: il dizionario è aggiornato frequentemente con correzioni e giurisprudenza